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I. Introduction
Prior to the current term and since the landmark decision
nearly seventy years ago in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2
the United States Supreme Court has issued only two decisions
regarding a non-forum state defendant's amenability to suit based
solely on its forum state activities not related to the plaintiffs
cause of action.3  Unfortunately, neither Perkins v. Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co.,4 nor Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia., S.A. v. Hall,5 gave litigants involved in international
or multi-state disputes clear guidance regarding the due process
boundaries of general in personam' jurisdiction. Similarly, in the
bifurcated wake of Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd., v. Superior
Court,7 practitioners and lower courts have struggled to determine
how to apply the stream of commerce doctrine, which at its most
basic level permits a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where the defendant has placed a product into a
2 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3 Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV.
807, 808 (2004).
4 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
5 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
6 In personam jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, also known as, "jurisdiction in
personam; jurisdiction of the person; [and] jurisdiction over the person," is defined as a
"court's power to bring a person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a
defendant's personal rights, rather than merely over property interests." BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 930-31 (9th ed. 2009).
7 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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distribution chain and that product later causes damage in the
forum state.' Absent additional guidance from the Court, lower
federal and state courts have lacked a basic framework or even a
clear theoretical foundation for satisfying complicated questions
that must be answered before subjecting non-forum state
defendants to a court's authority.9
Despite extensive review and critique by academics," no
single jurisdictional framework has been adopted across the
federal circuits and state courts, such that our judicial landscape
presents, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, an incoherent
"morass" of conflicting decisions." Not even the most basic
jurisdictional principles may be reconciled across the jurisdictional
holdings of federal and state courts, and thus they are of minimal
8 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
9 Rhodes, supra note 3, at 808; see, e.g., LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc.,
232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that there has never been a test for
determining whether a defendant's activities within a state are sufficient for general
jurisdiction); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It's Not General
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, But Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
559, 567 (1998) (noting that the Supreme Court's holdings on the matter provide very
limited guidance on the criteria necessary to confer general jurisdiction).
10 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 137 (2001) (proposing that general jurisdiction could also be
appropriate in states where a corporate defendant has a branch facility but not where the
defendant merely has customers or advertises a product); Sarah R. Cebik, "A Riddle
Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma: " General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of
Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 1, 36 (1998) (proposing that general jurisdiction
could be exercised over a defendant if it is incorporated, shapes its corporate policy to
comport with, or conducts its core activities within the forum state); B. Glenn George, In
Search of General Jurisdiction, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1097, 1129 (1990) (proposing that the
only requirement for the minimum contacts analysis for general jurisdiction is whether
the defendant has a corporate office in the forum); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument
and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv. 689, 758
(1987) (stating that the appropriate standard should be whether the defendant has treated
the forum state as its home); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 610, 676 (1988) (noting that general jurisdiction should be clearly limited
to "defendant's home base, that is, the defendant's domicile, principal residence, state of
incorporation, or principal place of business"). The only clear conclusion one can draw
from the myriad of academic approaches is that a defendant should only be subject to
general jurisdiction in a reasonably limited number of forum states. Rhodes, supra note
3, at 808-09.
11 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) ("It is quite
impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases; we must step from tuft to tuft
across the morass.").
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practical assistance to the judiciary as a body.12 Indeed, the variety
of "'formulas used to justify the exercise of .. . jurisdiction . . .'
lack coherence [and] appear to summon one line of decisions and
then another to support the varying moods of their opinions.""
The lack of predictability resulting from the state of jurisdictional
analysis is inefficient and diametrically opposed to due process.
The "bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent results" coming
out of our judicial system has been predicted to continue "'until
the Court itself draws the lines as the umpire of federalism.'" 4
By granting certiorari on petitions from the New Jersey
Supreme Court in J McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro," and from
the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations , S.A., v. Brown, 6 the Supreme Court acknowledged
the need to tackle the confusing issues that lower courts have been
grappling with since the last time the Court addressed either
general in personam jurisdiction or the stream of commerce
doctrine nearly twenty-five years ago." On June 27, 2011, the
Court issued its decisions on these two cases. The Goodyear
decision should provide some comfort to litigants by clarifying
that the overly complicated stream of commerce theory of
personal jurisdiction does not apply to general in personam
jurisdiction analysis. Additionally, the decisions send the message
that state courts' assertion of personal jurisdiction over non-forum
defendants had gotten out of control." Unfortunately, the
decisions did not go nearly as far as they could have to provide a
comprehensible framework for practitioners and lower courts
faced with personal jurisdiction questions.
12 Rhodes, supra note 3, at 809-10.
13 Severinsen v. Widener Univ., 768 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (quoting Twitchell, supra note 10, at 636-37). The Severinsen court was speaking
directly to the confusion amongst lower courts surrounding general jurisdiction, but the
idea applies just as readily to the confusion with the stream of commerce doctrine.
'4 Id.
15 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
16 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
17 Mark R. Vespole, Stream of Commerce in the 21st Century: McIntyre and
Goodyear: Potential Ramifications of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision on NJ and NC
Long Arm Jurisdiction Statutes, LexisNexis Emerging Issues Analysis, Dec. 13, 2010,
available at LexisNexis, 2010 Emerging Issues 5447.
18 It is unclear how this message will be received in light of the lack of a majority
in McIntyre.
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This Comment addresses jurisdictional problems faced by
foreign defendants involved in transnational litigation within the
United States court system, specifically in light of recent decisions
from New Jersey and North Carolina. This Comment is divided
into five sections: (1) the preceding introduction; (II) a selected
history of personal jurisdiction and the stream of commerce
theory; (III) a summary of the state court decisions that led to
Goodyear and McIntyre; (IV) an analysis of the oral arguments
before the Court and a look at the Court's decisions; and (V) a
conclusion discussing the impact the Supreme Court decisions will
have on corporations involved in transnational litigation.
II. The Foundation: A History of Personal Jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court
It is possible that personal jurisdiction has been the subject of
more academic commentary than any other area of American
law.'" Complicated jurisdictional issues can make the most
seasoned attorney cringe at the thought of first year civil procedure
lectures on Pennoyer v. Neff20 International Shoe,2 1 and Asahi
Metal.22 The complex questions inherent in jurisdictional analysis
have even become a source of lighthearted humor among attorneys
and law students alike.23 Much of the confusion confronting
attorneys, and the courts in which they practice, stems from
conflicting applications of the theories of specific jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction.2 4
19 See Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the
International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373,
381 (1995).
20 95 U.S. 714 (1877)
21 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see also Earl M. Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the
Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669, 670 (1987); Strauss, supra note 19, at 380.
23 Sean H. Hornbeck, Transnational Litigation and Personal Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Defendants, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (1996); see also John M. Brumbaugh
& William L. Reynolds, The Straight-Line Method of Determining Personal
Jurisdiction, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 130, 131 (1994) (proposing that a plaintiff who is
located in a state different than the defendant's home should choose a court halfway
between each, thereby equally dividing the inconvenience and burdens of the litigation
among the parties and the forum).
24 See Charles W. Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction
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The basic premise of the personal jurisdiction doctrine requires
that a court have the necessary authority to engage in binding
adjudication over a person.2 5
It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a
personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be
entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The existence of personal jurisdiction, in turn,
depends upon ... a sufficient connection between the defendant
and the forum State to make it fair to require defense of the
action in the forum. 26
Indeed, judgment of a person by a court lacking personal
jurisdiction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 ' Thus, personal jurisdiction is a prerequisite to
compelling a defendant to appear and defend against a lawsuit.
Without personal jurisdiction, a court may not hear a dispute nor
render binding judgment because a judgment rendered against a
party in its absence is generally invalid and unenforceable.28
Stated otherwise, personal jurisdiction is required whenever a
court wishes to exercise its power over a defendant.29
It is highly unlikely that any reader intrigued enough to have
continued this far into this Comment is unfamiliar with the
Supreme Court's first significant encounter30 with personal
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a "Generally" Too Broad, but "Specifically"
Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 136 (2005).
25 See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 60 (5th ed.
2001). As previously noted, personal jurisdiction may also be referred to as inpersonam
jurisdiction. Id. § 2.4, at 65. A court's adjudicatory jurisdiction over property rather
than a person is called in rem jurisdiction. Id. For purposes of this comment, "person"
may refer to an individual or a corporate person.
26 Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (citations
omitted).
27 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1990) (plurality
opinion).
28 Id. at 609-10.
29 Edward B. Adams, Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Parties, in
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL
COURTS 113 (David J. Levy ed., 2003).
30 See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 87 (2005) ("The Supreme
Court's first great confrontation with questions of jurisdiction came in the landmark case
552 [Vol. XXXVII
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jurisdiction questions in the famous (infamous to many first year
law students) case of Pennoyer v. Neff." Indeed, the following
subsections should serve as refreshers to the first year of law
school for most readers. While an abbreviated history of personal
jurisdiction is in order to make this piece complete, it is certainly
not the author's intent to call up repressed memories of late nights
huddled over a civil procedure textbook or the dreaded multi-hour
comprehensive end of semester exam. Instead the reader should
sit back, grab a nice cup of coffee (or other preferred beverage),
and read the following sections with the confidence one gains by
mastering (or at least comprehending) the material taught in the
first year of law school.
A. In the Beginning: Pennoyer v. Neff
Pennoyer, decided in 1878, served for nearly a century as the
basic statement of the limits on state court jurisdiction imposed by
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.3 2 The case arose
over a dispute between Marcus Neff and an attorney named John
Mitchell with whom Neff had contracted for legal services in
Oregon.3 3 Before completing his payment obligations under the
contract with Mitchell, Neff packed up and moved to California.3 4
To protect his financial interests, Mitchell initiated legal action to
of Pennoyer v. Neff in I 877."). But see Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the
Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back
Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 25 (1990) (noting that despite the common practice of
crediting Pennoyer as the start of "Supreme Court intervention in state court assertions
of personal jurisdiction," there were "a large number of cases on jurisdictional topics
prior to Pennoyer"). Professor Borchers' article provides an interesting summary of the
jurisdictional landscape in America prior to 1877. To the author's surprise, Professor
Borchers notes twenty-four cases on jurisdictional topics dating as far back as 1813. Id.
at 25-26 n.21.
31 95 U.S. 714 (1878). For an anecdote about the fabled facts of Pennoyer, read the
opening to Professor Linda Silberman's article relating the story of a New York street
beggar who convinced the professor that he was an out-of-luck former Harvard law
graduate and attorney by calling out "Pennoyer!" and then describing the case to her
satisfaction. See Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 33, 33-34 (1978).
32 See Pennoyer v Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (J878).
33 Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff The Hidden Agenda ofStephen J. Field, 28
SETON HALL L. REV. 75, 77-78 (1997).
34 See id at 79.
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recover in contract; 5 he proceeded as if Neff s move to California
had no bearing on the action. Fortunately for Mitchell, Neff
continued to own a piece of property in Oregon.36 This allowed
Mitchell to utilize Oregon's alternative notice provision, which
permitted service of process by posting notice of the suit on
property belonging to the defendant and making notice of the suit
public in the local newspaper for six weeks." Unfortunately for
Neff, he never saw either notice and did not appear in court.
Subsequently, the Oregon state court entered a default judgment
against Neff, seized his Oregon property, and sold the land at
auction to Sylvester Pennoyer to cover Mitchell's contract
judgment for his unpaid legal fees.
When Neff later returned to Oregon to check on the property
he thought he still owned, he discovered it in the possession of
Pennoyer and brought suit in federal court to void the sale to
Pennoyer." Neff sought to void the sale on the theory that the
Oregon court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, and thus had
no power to adjudicate the original dispute, because he was no
longer domiciled in Oregon.4' The lower federal court granted
Neff s reversal of the default judgment.42 After review, the
Supreme Court agreed that the judgment was void because Neff
had not been physically served with process while present in
Oregon, and the property had not been properly seized before the
judgment was pronounced.4 3 The Court held that jurisdiction was
proper in only three separate circumstances: (1) Where service of
process was made in the state establishing the defendant's physical
presence in the territory; (2) where the defendant was domiciled in
the state; or (3) where the defendant consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction over his person.44 The decision firmly entrenched the
35 Id. at 78-79.
36 Id. at 79.
37 Id.
38 Tocklin, supra note 33, at 79-80.
39 Id at 80.
40 Id. at 8 1.
41 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720-21 (1878).
42 Id. at 729.
43 Id. at 727.
44 Id. at 720, 723.
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territorial power theory as the key to personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.4 5
For the next seventy years, the Pennoyer requirements based
on territorial sovereignty remained at the center of personal
jurisdiction analysis. While modem jurisdictional analysis no
longer clings to the strictures set out by the Court in Pennoyer, the
most significant legacy of the decision is undoubtedly the insertion
of Fourteenth Amendment due process considerations into the law
of personal jurisdiction.46 Justice Stephen Field, writing for an
eight to one court, securely tied the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to jurisdictional analysis across all American
jurisdictions by linking the jurisdictional requirements of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause with the Due Process Clause. Following
Pennoyer, a judgment lacking proper jurisdiction could not be
enforced in other states or federal courts, and more importantly,
neither could it be enforced in the original rendering state. 48 The
doctrine restricted the ability of state courts to adjudicate claims
brought by aggrieved citizens against nonresidents, even when the
actions upon which the suit was based occurred in the state, and
even when the defendant could be found and given actual notice.49
By tying personal jurisdiction to due process concerns, the Court,
perhaps unwittingly, created a limitation that would eventually
cause the jurisdictional analysis of Pennoyer to fall out of step
with the economic and geographic realities of the twentieth
century.so
45 See, e.g., Robert L. Ashe et al., Comment, Getting Personal With Our
Neighbors-A Survey of Southern States' Exercise of General Jurisdiction and a Proposal
for Extending Georgia's Long-Arm Statute, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2009);
Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a
Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1059, 1067 n.35 (1990). The
territorial power theory was expressed by Justice Field in two statements in the Court's
opinion: first, "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory; . . . [second,] "no tribunal established by [a state] can
extend its process beyond that territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
46 See, e.g., Tocklin, supra note 33, at 94-95.
47 Id. at 94, 138-39.
48 Id. at 138.
49 Mushlin, supra note 45, at 1067-68.
50 Ashe et al., supra note 45, at 1179-80. But see, Tocklin supra note 33, at 138-
139 (arguing that Justice Field, as a "master at planting seeds that might yield later
harvest," deliberately provided later courts with the means to protect "individuals against
2011] 555
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B. So Began the Twentieth Century: International Shoe
As this country entered the twentieth century, the rise of the
modem corporation increasingly brought state judicial systems
into conflict with corporate entities who were legally incorporated
elsewhere, but who undertook activities that affected the forum
state's citizens on a regular basis."' The jurisdictional standard of
the time, as established in Pennoyer, restricted jurisdictional
authority to persons or corporate entities "present" within the
state's territorial boundaries.5 2 For many years, courts across the
country had strained the limits of the Pennoyer" decision by
creating legal fictions that satisfied the "presence" or consent
requirements, thereby allowing states to assert jurisdiction over
nonresidents and foreign corporations.5 4 These fictions pushed the
boundaries of personal jurisdiction analysis to near absurdity and
were inadequate to deal with the economic complexities of the
twentieth century.
In order to mete out justice in complex personal and business
disputes spanning state and international borders, the states needed
a transactional approach that would permit jurisdiction over non-
forum state parties in disputes that arose from specific in-state
activities. 6 Over half a century ago, the Supreme Court heard the
defining case that started the American judicial system along the
arbitrary actions of the government").
51 See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF, supra note 30, at 92; FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 70-71 (3d ed. 2004).
52 Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
53 Id.
54 Erik T. Moe, Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream
of Commerce Doctrine, Barely Alive But Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 206 (1987).
Following Pennoyer, courts began to adopt fictions that provided alternatives to a
defendant's physical presence in the forum state. See Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain't the
Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal
Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fih Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REv. 681, 688 (2009). Some of
the more prevalent fictions included not recognizing the legal existence of foreign
corporations in a state unless the corporation had first appointed an agent for service or
premising corporate presence in a state on the presence of employees or bank accounts.
Id. at 689. These developments allowed states to enter judgments on persons served with
process while located within a state, against property located in a state, or against a
person who "consented" to jurisdiction. Id. at 688.
55 See Laughlin, supra note 54, at 689.
56 ISSACHAROFF, supra note 30, at 92.
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path to its current jurisdictional posture. In International Shoe
Company v. Washington,7 the Supreme Court established the
principle that personal jurisdiction is proper when a nonresident
defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."5  The International Shoe
Company, a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Missouri,
employed roving salesmen to sell shoes door-to-door during the
Depression. 59 The sales workforce of between eleven and thirteen
people in the State of Washington was paid on commission, met
with prospective customers in motels and hotels, and occasionally
rented space to put up displays. 60 All orders taken in Washington
were sent to St. Louis, Missouri for acceptance and, once
accepted, the shoes were then shipped from points elsewhere into
Washington."
The State of Washington attempted to enforce the state labor
code against International Shoe by asserting that the company
owed the state unemployment compensation fund contributions.62
When the company refused to pay, Washington initiated
administrative proceedings to collect the funds. International
Shoe maintained that because it was not physically present in the
state and conducted no business in the state, there was no
jurisdictional basis for haling the company into the Washington
court system.64 International Shoe seemed untouchable.65
That is, until the Court rejected International Shoe's argument
based on lack of physical presence and established a new test for
personal jurisdiction. As the Court explained, the "terms 'present'
or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be
57 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
58 Id. at 316.
59 ISSACHAROFF, supra note 30, at 92-93.
60 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313-14.
61 Id. at 314.
62 Id. at 311.
63 Id. at 312.
64 Id. at 311-12.
65 ISSACHAROFF, supra note 30, at 93.
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sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process."6 6 Since
International Shoe, personal jurisdiction analysis has required that
two tests be satisfied: (1) The defendant must have "minimum
contacts" with the forum to justify the state courts' jurisdiction
over it; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must not "offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."67 The key
outcome of International Shoe was that a defendant could be
regarded as present in the forum state for purposes of jurisdictional
analysis not through fictions such as where notice happened to be
served or through creative methods of establishing permanent
domicile, but rather by the defendant's conduct towards and within
the forum. 68  In doing away with the fictions created over the
previous seventy years within the confines of Pennoyer, the Court
instituted a fairness element such that the contacts a corporation
has with the forum state make it "reasonable . . . to require the
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there."6
By establishing a new personal jurisdiction doctrine based on
minimum contacts with the forum, the Court in International Shoe
opened the door to modern personal jurisdiction analysis. It
expanded the ability of states to provide justice for their citizens
when they were injured by non-forum defendants, and it became
the bedrock upon which other theories of jurisdiction have been
built.
C. The Path to General (and Specific) Confusion: Perkins
and Helicopteros
In a series of cases decided in the years since International
Shoe, the Supreme Court has revisited the issue of personal
jurisdiction on thirteen notable occasions.7 0 Arguably, the Court
66 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
67 Id. at 314.
68 See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 30, at 93.
69 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
70 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding that personal
service of process over a nonresident who was temporarily in the forum is enough to
establish jurisdiction); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(outlining the two branches of the stream of commerce theory); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (stating that due process protects an individual's liberty
interest in not being subject to jurisdiction in a forum where he lacks minimum contacts);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (stating that the traditional
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has advanced the personal jurisdiction doctrine in those cases.
One of the doctrinal advancements following International Shoe
under the umbrella of personal jurisdiction analysis was the
categorization of jurisdiction as either general or specific in nature.
The Court began to develop the two types of in personam
jurisdiction in a case dealing with jurisdictional matters that
followed seven short years after International Shoe."
1. Perkins
In 1952, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company.7 2 The case revolved
around the actions of Benguet Mining, a company created under
the laws of the Philippines."
The company had made the strategic decision to cease
operations of its gold and silver mines in the Philippines during
World War II while the Japanese occupied the region." The
minimum contacts analysis does not apply when the plaintiff is absent); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (stating that contacts with
the forum must be of a "continuous and systematic nature" to support the exercise of
general jurisdiction); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (upholding
jurisdiction in New Hampshire over an Ohio company that published allegedly
defamatory material nationwide because such publication had an effect in New
Hampshire); Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982) (reiterating that the test for personal jurisdiction requires that the suit not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" and stating that personal
jurisdiction may be waived); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980) (establishing the stream of commerce theory but stating that mere foreseeability is
insufficient to support jurisdiction); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (stating
that a defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state so as not to
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977) (stating that personal jurisdiction requires a "relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation"); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)
(holding that unilateral activity by one party with the nonresident defendant cannot
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that a single insurance policy issued to a California citizen by a
Texas insurer satisfied "minimum contacts" for jurisdiction in California courts); Perkins
v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (holding that substantial business
activities within the forum justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
7' See Perkins v Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); discussion
infra Part II.C.L
72 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
73 Id. at 439.
74 Id. at 439, 448.
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president of the company, who was also the principal stockholder,
returned to his home in Ohio for the duration of the occupation.75
In order to maintain the company during the war, Benguet Mining
opened an office in Ohio, from which it continued basic
operations.76 The Ohio office consisted of the president and two
secretaries. The activities undertaken at the Ohio office consisted
of opening two bank accounts for the company, paying salaries
and other expenses for the company, holding directors' meetings,
corresponding on the company's behalf, and supervising the
rehabilitation of the company's properties in the Philippines."
The suit arose when Idonah Perkins, a nonresident of Ohio,
filed an action in Ohio against the company for alleged dividends
due to her as a stockholder and for damages resulting from the
company's failure to issue to her certificates for shares of its
stock." The lower courts, including the Ohio State Supreme
Court, all agreed that Ohio did not have personal jurisdiction over
the company as it was a foreign corporation and the claims upon
which the suit was brought did not relate to any of the defendant's
actions in Ohio.79
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that Ohio
could validly exercise personal jurisdiction "to enforce a cause of
action not arising out of the [defendant's] activities in the state of
the forum."so The Court based its decision on the company
president's "continuous and systematic supervision of the
necessarily limited wartime activities of the company" from his
office in Ohio."' Despite the fact that the cause of action did not
arise in Ohio, nor did it relate to the company's actions there, the
Court applied a contacts test and found jurisdiction proper to
ensure "general fairness."82 The Court's holding ultimately built
on the language from International Shoe, stating that "continuous
corporate operations within a state" could be "so substantial and of
75 Id. at 447.
76 Id. at 447-48.
77 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438-39.
78 Id. at 448.
79 Id at 439-42.
80 Id. at 446.
81 Id. at 448.
82 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445.
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such a nature" that a state could exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction
over a defendant for any causes of action, even those unrelated to
the defendant's forum contacts.
2. Helicopteros
The jurisdictional theory supporting Perkins became known as
general jurisdiction, while the exercise of jurisdiction based on
contacts giving rise to the claim itself is what we recognize today
as specific jurisdiction. The Supreme Court first explicitly
recognized the bifurcation in jurisdictional analysis in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,84 when it
addressed the question of whether a Colombian corporation could
be sued in Texas over a helicopter crash in Peru."
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. ("Helicol") was a
Colombian corporation that specialized in providing helicopter
transportation for oil and construction companies over difficult
South American terrain." The plaintiffs in Helicopteros were the
representatives and survivors of four American citizens killed in
the crash of a helicopter owned and operated by Helicol that
occurred in Peru.87 The case took on jurisdictional significance
because of Helicol's ongoing relationship with Texas-based Bell
Helicopter Company, which prompted the plaintiffs to file suit in
that state. Ultimately, both parties conceded that the claims
regarding the helicopter accident did not arise from or have any
relationship to Helicol's previous contacts with the state of Texas,
but the nature of Helicol's contacts prompted the courts to
examine whether adjudicative authority over the company was
proper in the state on any cause of action regardless of the relation
to those contacts.89
The contacts the plaintiffs put forward to support jurisdiction
over Helicol were that the corporation purchased a majority of its
helicopters in Texas, trained its pilots in Texas, and conducted the
83 Id. at 446 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945)).
84 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
85 Id. at 409-10.
86 Id. at 409.
87 Id. at 410.
88 Id. at 411.
89 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 411.
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negotiation session in Texas, which led to Helicol's service
agreement to transport employees of American companies in
South America.9 0 The Supreme Court reversed the Texas high
court decision, holding that Texas did not have the authority to
exercise jurisdiction over Helicol.' The Court stated that the
aforementioned contacts were not "the kind of continuous and
systematic general business contacts ... found ... in Perkins."9 2
The Court also reaffirmed the holding in Perkins93 that a showing
of continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state would
support jurisdiction over the defendant in a suit there, "[e]ven
when the cause of action [did] not arise out of or relate to the
foreign corporation's activities in the forum State."94  The
argument supporting the Court's holding that there was no basis
for personal jurisdiction was the Court's first explicit
acknowledgement of general jurisdiction analysis.9 5 In a series of
footnotes, the Court clearly set out the meanings of the general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction labels, noting, "when a State
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising
out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the
State is exercising 'specific jurisdiction,"' 9 6 but "[w]hen a State
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum,
the State has been said to be exercising 'general jurisdiction."' 97
90 Id. at 415-16.
91 Id. at 418-19.
92 Id. at 416.
93 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
94 Id. at 414.
95 See Borchers, supra note 30, at 71-72 ("Applying the test for general jurisdiction
of 'continuous and systematic' activities first suggested in International Shoe, and
developed somewhat in Perkins, the Court found the defendant's contacts insufficient to
support jurisdiction.") (footnotes omitted). In Helicol, the Court further noted that no
specific jurisdiction analysis was needed because the point had been conceded when no
party advanced arguments regarding a relationship between the cause of action and the
company's forum contacts. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16 n.10.
96 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121,
1144-64 (1966)).
97 Id. at 415 n.9 (citations omitted).
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D. Adrift in the Stream of Commerce: World-Wide and Asahi
In another line of cases following International Shoe,98 the
Court limited the contacts required to confer jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant to those contacts through which the
defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State."9 9 Purposeful availment arises
where the defendant's contacts with the forum "proximately result
from actions by the defendant . .. that create a 'substantial
connection' with the forum,"' or where the defendant's efforts
are "purposefully directed" at the state.''
The rationale behind the "purposeful availment" requirement
is to ensure that non-forum defendants will have some warning of
whether they are subject to lawsuits.'0 2 Stated another way,
purposeful availment protects foreign defendants from being
subjected to the authority of local courts solely as the result of
"random, fortuitous or attenuated" contacts over which they had
no control.'o3 Following this line of reasoning, the Court has
found that a single act may be enough to support jurisdiction if the
contact with the forum is a result of the defendant's conduct and
created a "substantial connection" with the forum state.104
Difficult questions arise in the tort context when a plaintiff seeks
to subject a product manufacturer to jurisdiction in a state that its
products reached despite no effort of the manufacturer to
intentionally sell or market goods in the forum state."os
98 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
99 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
100 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citing McGee v.
Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
101 Id. at 472 (citations omitted) ("Where a forum seeks to assert specific
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there, this 'fair
warning' requirement is satisfied if the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his
activities at residents of the forum .. . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that
'arise out of or relate to' those activities.").
102 Id. at 475.
103 Id. (internal citations omitted).
104 McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
105 Adams, supra note 29, at 118.
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1. World-Wide
In the critical case of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,10 6 the Court focused on creating some guidelines for
out-of-state product manufacturers and in doing so articulated the
well-known stream of commerce doctrine for products liability
actions."O7 The plaintiffs in the case purchased a new Audi vehicle
from a car dealer in New York.' 8 Shortly after purchasing the
vehicle, the plaintiffs decided to move from New York to a new
home in Arizona.'0 9 To get to their new home, the plaintiffs set
out on a cross-country trip in their vehicle, but unfortunately got
into a serious accident while passing through Oklahoma."0 The
gas tank caught fire and caused several of the passengers in the car
to be burned."' The injured occupants of the vehicle filed a
products liability lawsuit in state court in Oklahoma against a
ranging group of defendants that included the following: the New
York dealer that sold the plaintiffs the car; the regional distributor
that distributed Audi vehicles in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut; the Volkswagen importer that imported all Audi
vehicles from Germany into the United States; and the automobile
manufacturer that manufactured the vehicle at issue in Germany.112
The basis of the claim was that the plaintiffs' injuries resulted
from the defective design of the gas tank and fuel system in their
new car." 3
The New York car dealer and the regional distributor made
special appearances in the Oklahoma court to assert that the court
did not have proper authority to exercise jurisdiction over them." 4
The trial judge denied the petition and allowed personal
jurisdiction over the car dealer and the regional distributor."' The
106 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
107 Id. at 297-98.
108 Id. at 288.
109 Id.
110 Id.
11 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
112 Id. Neither the importer nor the foreign car manufacturer challenged jurisdiction
in this particular action. Id.
113 Id
114 Id.
115 Id. at 289.
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defendants then submitted a writ of prohibition to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to restrain the trial judge from exercising personal
jurisdiction, but that court denied their request." 6 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the important
constitutional questions implicated in the case.'"
In its opinion, the Court observed that the limits on state
jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment had been
substantially relaxed over the years, primarily due to the
challenges presented by the modem economy."' The Court found
that neither defendant had purposefully reached out to create a
contact with Oklahoma,"' and held that the "the mere unilateral
activity" by the plaintiffs of taking their vehicle to the forum state
did not satisfy the requirements of minimum contacts with
Oklahoma. 20 The court subsequently dismissed the claims against
the New York auto dealer and the regional Audi distributor for
lack of personal jurisdiction. 2 '
The plaintiffs in World- Wide Volkswagen argued that "because
an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose it was
'foreseeable' that [it] would cause injury in Oklahoma."' 22 The
Court dismissed this assertion by explaining that foreseeability
cannot by itself support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
defendant.'23 The Court then went on to explain the way in which
foreseeability is relevant:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not
the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the
forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.' 24
116 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 289-90.
'17 Id. at 291.
118 Id. at 292-93 (citing McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957)).
'19 Id. at 298.
120 Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1957)).
121 Perkins, 342 U.S. at 299.
122 Id. at 295.
123 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
124 Id. at 297.
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Interspersed within the Court's holding that jurisdiction was
not proper over the car dealer or regional distributor was dicta that
implied that the foreign importer of the car and the foreign
manufacturer of the car would be subject to personal jurisdiction
in the forum. 25 Specifically, the Court stated that:
[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as
Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but
arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to
serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other
States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those
States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the
source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does
not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts
personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products
into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will
be purchased by consumers in the forum State.'26
The contrast between the clear holding by the Court that
jurisdiction could not be based upon the foreseeable unilateral
actions of a consumer and the pronouncement of the basic stream
of commerce doctrine left lower courts operating in the wake of
World- Wide Volkswagen with the question of precisely what
quality and quantity of contacts would demonstrate an
"expectation that [a defendant's products] will be purchased by
consumers in the forum State" such that jurisdiction could be
exercised over a non-forum manufacturer or distributor. 27 Put
another way, practitioners and lower courts lacked clear guidance
as to whether a defendant's act of placing a product into the stream
of commerce that might foreseeably end up in a particular state
would satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of the Due
Process Clause.'2 8
125 Simard, supra note 9, at 578.
126 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
127 Id. at 298.
128 See id.
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2. Asahi
Given the conflicting messages presented by World- Wide
Volkswagen,129 it should not be surprising that lower courts
differed in their interpretation. 130 Asahi Metal Industry Company,
Ltd., v. Superior Court of California,131 gave the Court the
opportunity to clarify the confusion over the stream of commerce
doctrine. Unfortunately, no majority conclusion came out of the
Court's deliberations.
The Asahi case revolved around a 1978 motorcycle accident in
California.13 2  While traveling on the highway, the motorcycle
operator lost control and collided with a tractor-trailer.'3 3 The
motorcycle operator was seriously injured, and the passenger, who
was also the operator's wife, was killed in the crash.134  The
operator alleged that the reason he lost control of the motorcycle
was that the rear tire failed and then exploded while he was
driving on the highway.' The operator filed a products liability
action in California alleging that the motorcycle tire, tube, and
sealant were all defective.13 6 The operator filed the suit against
Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd. ("Cheng Shin"), the
Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube on the motorcycle.137
Cheng Shin filed a cross-claim for indemnification against Asahi
Metal Industry Co., Ltd. ("Asahi"), the Japanese manufacturer of
the valve assembly on the tube.'3 8 The claims against Cheng Shin
and other defendants were settled prior to the case coming before
129 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
130 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("Some courts have understood the Due Process
Clause, as interpreted in World- Wide Volkswagen, to allow an exercise of personal
jurisdiction to be based on no more than the defendant's act of placing the product in the
stream of commerce. Other courts have understood . . . World-Wide Volkswagen to
require the action of the defendant to be more purposefully directed at the forum State
than the mere act of placing a product in the stream of commerce.").
'3' Id.
132 Id. at 105.
133 Id
134 Id
135 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06.
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the California Supreme Court; by that time only the cross-claim
for indemnity against Asahi remained.' 39
Asahi asserted that California could not exercise jurisdiction
over it because the company did not have sufficient contacts with
the forum state.'4 0 The California Supreme Court found that the
trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi was proper because
Asahi knew that some of its tire valve assemblies sold to Cheng
Shin would eventually be sold in California.'4 ' The Court
unanimously reversed the California Supreme Court decision that
personal jurisdiction over Asahi was proper,'42 but was once again
divided on the reasoning behind that decision.'43 While both sides
could agree that Asahi did not possess "minimum contacts such
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction [would be] consistent
with fair play and substantial justice," 44 there was disagreement
on the question of whether the company could be said to have
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in
California.
The Court, in a plurality opinion, advanced two different views
of the stream of commerce doctrine, one by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and the other by Justice William Brennan, with each
view supported by four different members of the Court.145  The
139 Id.
140 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105-06. Asahi and Cheng Shin submitted detailed
descriptions of their business relationship. Id. Asahi asserted that all business between
Cheng Shin and Asahi was conducted in Asia. Id. The president of Asahi submitted an
affidavit that "declared that Asahi 'has never contemplated that its limited sales of tire
valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would subject it to lawsuits in California."' Id. at 107
(citations omitted). But in contrast, there was also an affidavit of a Cheng Shin manager
stating that he believed that Asahi "'was fully aware that valve stem assemblies sold to
my company and to others would end up throughout the United States and in
California."' Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, there was evidence that twenty percent
of Cheng Shin's sales in the United States were in California. Id. at 106.
141 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108 ("The [California Supreme Court] considered Asahi's
intentional act of placing its components into the stream of commerce-that is, by
delivering the components to Cheng Shin in Taiwan-coupled with Asahi's awareness
that some of the components would eventually find their way into California, sufficient
to form the basis for state court jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.").
142 Id
143 Id. at 105.
144 Id. at 116.
145 Id. at 105, 116.
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division was centered along basic ideological lines, with the
Court's three generally conservative members supporting Justice
O'Connor's view and the Court's three generally liberal Justices
agreeing with Justice Brennan. 146
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
and Justices Lewis Powell and Antonin Scalia, set out what is
commonly known as the "foreseeability plus" or "stream of
commerce plus" theory of minimum contacts.147  O'Connor
believed that Asahi did not have the minimum contacts with
California necessary to establish jurisdiction because it did not
purposefully avail itself of the market in California.148
In support of this position, she reasoned that the simple
knowledge that some of its component parts might end up in
products that would be sold in California was not a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction.149  Some sort of "[a]dditional conduct" by the
defendant such as "designing the product for the market in the
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to
serve as the sales agent in the forum State" is necessary.'s Justice
O'Connor stated that the sale of components that made their way
into the forum, absent any of the other factors indicating a
purposeful relationship with the forum and intent to serve the
forum, were insufficient to establish the minimum contacts
requirement."' Applying this rule to the facts of Asahi, O'Connor
concluded that since the company had merely placed its
component products into the stream of commerce that swept the
products into California on Cheng Shin's order, the minimum
contacts requirement had not been met.'52
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
146 Vespole, supra note 17. It is important to note that Justice Scalia, one of the
more conservative members of the Court, is the only Justice from the Asahi Court who is
still presently on the Court. Id.
147 See Adams, supra note 29, at 119; Vespole, supra note 17.
148 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
149 Id. ("The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is
not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.").
150 Id.
151 Id. at 112-13.
152 Id.
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Byran White, Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun, disagreed
with the interpretation of the stream of commerce theory put
forward by Justice O'Connor as well as her conclusion that Asahi
had not purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
California."' Justice Brennan argued that Justice O'Connor's
opinion that something considerably more than foreseeability was
needed was a "minority view" of the stream of commerce
theory.154 Justice Brennan further noted that Justice O'Connor's
view "represented a marked retreat" from the Court's analysis in
World- Wide.'"' Justice Brennan argued that simply placing a
product into the stream of commerce with knowledge that the
product will eventually be used in the forum state constitutes
purposeful availment.156 The Brennan group defined the stream of
commerce as "the regular and anticipated flow of products from
manufacture to distribution to retail sale" and stated that a
company cannot be surprised by a lawsuit where their product
knowingly arrives in the forum through the stream of commerce.'5 7
With the issue of purposeful availment dividing the Court, the
decision to deny California jurisdiction over Asahi was based on
other factors. Part II.B. of the opinion, which was supported by all
the justices except Justice Scalia, gives the most comprehensive
look at what other factors the Court considered.'5 1 In Part II.B. of
the opinion, Justice O'Connor explained the traditional five-factor
test that analyzes "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the
forum State, . . . the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, . . . 'the
interstate judicial system's interest in . . . efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in
153 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring).
154 Id. at 118 (Brennan, J., concurring).
155 Id
156 Id. at 118-21. Justice Brennan highlighted the distinction between the facts in
World-Wide Volkswagen and those at issue in Asahi, where the key point was how the
car that caused injury traveled into the forum state. In Asahi the valve assembly
"reach[ed] a distant State through a chain of distribution" whereas in World-Wide the
vehicle reached the "[s]tate because a consumer .. . took [it] there." Id. at 120 (internal
citations omitted). Justice Brennan then argued that mere awareness by Asahi that
Cheng Shin's world-wide distribution system included shipping valve assemblies to
California was sufficient to bring Asahi within the definition of purposeful availment
from World-Wide. Id. at 120-21.
157 Id. at 117.
158 Maltz, supra note 22, at 679.
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furthering fundamental substantive social policies."""
Justice O'Connor noted that the burden on Asahi was
"severe,"l60 the interest of California was slight,'6' and the
plaintiffs interest was slight.16 2 Justice O'Connor then discussed
the final two factors in tandem, noting that the Court must
consider "the procedural and substantive policies of other nations
whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the
California court." 63  The opinion cautioned that courts must
undertake "a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the
assertion of jurisdiction" over foreign defendants and maintain an
"unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant
outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the
forum State."i" Citing a dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan in
the Court's earlier case of United States v. First National City
Bank,'65 Justice O'Connor clearly felt that the Court should be
very careful not to extend American "'notions of personal
jurisdiction into the international field' unless absolutely
necessary.166 Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded that, given "the
international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and
the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise
of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this
instance would be unreasonable and unfair." 6 7
Since the decision was issued, Asahi has frustrated legal
scholars and lower courts regarding the limits of the exercise of
159 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
160 Id. at 114 ("Certainly the burden on the defendant in this case is severe. Asahi
has been commanded by the Supreme Court of California not only to traverse the
distance between Asahi's headquarters in Japan and the Superior Court of California in
and for the County of Solano, but also to submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign
nation's judicial system.").
161 Id. ("Because the plaintiff is not a California resident, California's legitimate
interests in the dispute have considerably diminished.").
162 Id. ("Cheng Shin has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate
its indemnification claim against Asahi in California rather than in Taiwan or Japan.").
163 Id. at 115.
164 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.
165 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
166 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115 (citing First Nat'l, 379 U.S. at 404 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
167 Id. at 116.
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personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants under long-arm
statutesl68 consistent with the Due Process Clause. With no
additional guidance from the Court since the divided opinion in
Asahi, there is now inconsistency in federal circuit courts and
numerous state courts in regards to how the foreseeablity test
should be applied. The stream of commerce plus test elaborated
by Justice O'Connor is being used in the First, Fourth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, while the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits use Justice Brennan's basic stream of commerce
analysis.' 6 9  There are other federal circuit courts that use both
tests to analyze personal jurisdiction instead of picking one or the
other.' There is just as much if not more division between state
courts over the use of the two branches of the stream of commerce
analysis.17 ' Clearly the Asahi opinion has left a mess, typified by
significant analytical variations and divergent applications by
lower courts: It is high time for the Court to straighten out this
complicated issue.
E. The Court's Most Recent Foray into Personal
Jurisdiction: Burnham
Prior to the current matters before the court in Goodyear and
McIntyre, the last Supreme Court case to deal significantly with
personal jurisdiction was Burnham v. Superior Court of
California.'72  The case centered on the interstate divorce
proceedings of Dennis and Francie Burnham.'7 3 The couple was
married in West Virginia, but later moved to and had children in
168 State long-arm statutes grant authority to trial courts to assert jurisdiction over
non-forum state defendants. "Statutes authorizing courts to reach beyond their own
borders came to be known as 'long-arm' statutes: states were extending their
jurisdictional 'arms.' The name has stuck." STEVEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 187
(4th ed. 1996). There are two basic models of long-arm statutes: (1) the statute may state
that jurisdiction extends to the limits provided by the United States Constitution; or (2)
the statute limits the application of jurisdiction to some point within the constitutional
boundaries. Louis U. Gasparini, Comment, The Internet and Personal Jurisdiction:
Traditional Jurisprudence for the Twenty-First Century Under the New York CPLR, 12
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 191, 209 (2001).
169 See Laughlin, supra note 54, at 704 n.129-132.
170 Id. at 704 n.132.
171 Id
172 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
173 Id. at 607.
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New Jersey.174  Several years later, the Burnhams separated and
agreed that the wife would file for divorce in New Jersey due to
irreconcilable differences, move to California, and retain custody
of the children.'7 1 Contrary to their agreement, the husband filed
for divorce claiming desertion after the wife moved to California
with the children.176  The husband did not serve the wife with
process, and after unsuccessfully attempting to get the husband to
adhere to their agreement, the wife filed for divorce herself in
California.177 Later that year, the husband travelled to the southern
part of California for a short business trip and while there
proceeded to visit his children.178 When he returned his children to
the wife's new California home, the husband was served with the
divorce papers.179 After returning to New Jersey, the husband
entered a special appearance in California to contest the superior
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction.' The California trial
court rejected the motion, and on appeal, the California Court of
Appeals denied mandamus relief.'
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident husband.182
Despite common agreement that jurisdiction over the husband was
proper in this situation, the factions on the Court could not resolve
the broader personal jurisdiction issues involved in the case.
Justice Scalia, joined by three other justices, concluded that tag
jurisdiction remains a valid basis for jurisdiction such that states
may continue to exercise jurisdiction based only on physical




177 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607-08.
178 Id. at 608.
179 Id
180 Id
181 Id. at 608. The Supreme Court of California then denied a hearing, which
allowed the United States Supreme Court to direct a writ of certiorari to the intermediate
California appellate court in order to review the grounds for jurisdiction. Id.
182 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 628.
183 Robert Taylor-Manning, Note, An Easy Case Makes Bad Law-Burnham v.
Superior Court of California, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990), 66 WASH L. REV. 623, 630-31
(1991) (noting that the Scalia plurality did not agree with the husband's assertion that
5732011]
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agreed that the California courts could exercise jurisdiction over
the husband, but did not base this conclusion solely on the
assertion of tag jurisdiction; Brennan argued that the due process
concerns "developed in International Shoe and Shaffer invalidated
physical presence as a sufficient basis on which to justify
jurisdiction."'8 4  Justice Brennan went on to conduct a minimum
contacts analysis that found it was proper to assert in personam
jurisdiction over the husband.' 5
The Burnham decision, like Asahi, has provided very limited
value to practitioners because of the Court's lack of consensus.18 6
The fundamental issues underscoring the division between the two
main factions in Burnham are deeply rooted in opposing
philosophical, political, and legal positions. The Scalia group
stressed the importance of adhering to common law precedent on
transient jurisdiction and gave weight to the state sovereignty
concerns involved with limiting the jurisdictional authority of state
courts.'87  Justice Brennan, writing for his faction, obviously
"jurisdiction must comport with the minimum contacts test of International Shoe" while
limiting the Shaffer holding "to quasi in rem matters"); see also Borchers, supra note 30,
at 82 ("All Shaffer meant to do, according to Scalia, was to require that in rem
jurisdictional assertions have a jurisdictional basis which would suffice for an in
personam action.").
184 Taylor-Manning, supra note 183, at 631.
185 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637-38 (Brennan J., concurring). Justice Brennan
reasoned that the husband's presence in the state of California was sufficient to find that
the husband had purposefully availed himself of the benefits provided by California. Id.
("[Burnham's] health and safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire, and
emergency medical services; he is free to travel on the State's roads and waterways; he
likely enjoys the fruits of the State's economy as well."). Justice Brennan continued his
analysis, stating that out-of-state defendants have the same protections and right of
access to forum state courts. Id. at 638. He also noted that due to modern transportation
and evidence that the husband had previously travelled to California, the burden on the
out-of-state defendant in this case was slight. Id. at 638-39.
186 See, e.g., United States v. Saperstein, 723 F.2d 1221, 1225 (6th Cir. 1983)
(stating that the plurality opinion has provided little binding precedent); United States v.
Friedman, 528 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1976) ("[A] mere plurality pronouncement of
this type does not have [a] binding effect."). But see Ashe et al., supra note 45, at 1183-
84 (quoting ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS
139-44 (3d ed. 1998)) (noting that despite the division in the Court, there was a "'clear
holding' . . . that absent unusual circumstances, physical presence alone would suffice to
permit the exercise of general jurisdiction over a defendant").
187 Taylor-Manning, supra note 183, at 632 ("This approach misread the Court's
prior personal jurisdiction decisions, and failed to recognize the primacy of due process
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"valued due process and defended the modem minimum contacts
approach," but was overly broad in his application of the
doctrine.' One critic notes that "Justice Scalia's analysis cannot
be reconciled with due process concerns or personal jurisdiction
developments since International Shoe,"' but that Justice
Brennan's "broad definition [of minimum contacts] is little better
than the bright tine rule of transient jurisdiction."l9 0 Perhaps the
true value in the Burnham decision lies not in the clarification, or
lack thereof, that it provides to attorneys and their clients faced
with jurisdictional questions, but rather in the fact that it serves as
a poignant reminder for the current Court of the need to come to a
consensus in order to clarify the murky waters of personal
jurisdiction.
111. Recent State Decisions on Personal Jurisdiction
Analysis
A. North Carolina Court ofAppeals Applies the Stream of
Commerce Theory to General Jurisdiction
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided Brown v.
Meter"' on August t8, 2009. Judge Sam Ervin, writing for a
three-judge panel, found that North Carolina could assert personal
jurisdiction over a group of foreign manufacturers so long as they
had intentionally placed their products into the stream of
commerce without excluding North Carolina from distribution of
their product.19 2 The case arose from a wrongful death action
involving two teenage boys who died following a bus accident in
France.' 93 Julian Brown and Matthew Helms, two thirteen-year-
old soccer players from the state of North Carolina, died from
injuries sustained after a tire on the bus allegedly failed, causing it
over sovereignty concerns.").
188 Id. at 631-32, 638-39 ("Justice Brennan recognized that most situations
involving individuals' physical presence also involve intentional, purposeful or knowing
risk that their presence makes them subject to state court jurisdiction . . . however,
Justice Brennan's application of minimum contacts was too broad.").
189 Id. at 640.
190 Id. at 632.
191 Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
192 Id at 384.
193 Id
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to careen off the road and crash near Paris, France, on April 18,
2004.194 The accident occurred while the boys and their coaches
were riding in the bus to the airport to return to the United States
after competing in an international soccer tournament.19 5
The specific tire in question was manufactured by Goodyear
Lastikleri T. A. S. ("Goodyear Turkey").196 Two other affiliates,
which manufactured a similar tire, Goodyear Dunlop Tires France
SA ("Goodyear France") and Goodyear Luxembourg Tires SA
("Goodyear Luxembourg"), were named as defendants.' 97 As their
names suggest, all three foreign companies are subsidiaries of the
parent company, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company.'" All three
of the aforementioned foreign Goodyear entities, as well as the
parent corporation, were named as defendants in the original
action.199
The parents of the boys, as administrators of the estates,
initiated an action in a North Carolina superior court against the
manufacturer and distributors of the tire, despite the accident
having occurred in France.200 The parents alleged that the accident
was caused by the failure of one of the tires on the bus when the
plies separated from the rubber.20 ' The plaintiffs' theory was that
the foreign Goodyear companies negligently designed,
constructed, tested, and inspected the tire at issue and that the
companies failed to give proper warning of latent defects.2 02
At trial, the three foreign Goodyear entities filed motions to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and supported their
motions with affidavits from each of the companies' officers
stating that each company did no business within North
Carolina.20 3 The trial court found additional evidence that in the
194 Id
195 Id
196 Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 384.
197 Id. Since the beginning of this action Goodyear Luxembourg Tires SA has
changed its name to Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations SA. Br. for Pet'rs at 2,
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76).
198 Id. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company is an Ohio corporation. Id.




203 Id. at 384-85. Notably, the United States-based parent company did not contest
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years from 2004 to 2007, tires manufactured by each of the foreign
companies had been shipped into North Carolina, though "not by
the original manufacturer." 20 4 The parents of the deceased soccer
players submitted evidence from an expert who examined the tire
involved in the accident.2 05 The expert found that the tire on the
bus in the accident, as well as the tires shipped to North Carolina,
were made for the United States market and had instructions and
information on them written in English. 2 06  The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss, and its decision was upheld by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals.207
In determining that all three foreign Goodyear corporations
had the requisite minimum contacts with North Carolina under its
long-arm statute, 2 08 Judge Ervin, writing for the three-judge court
of appeals panel, found that the foreign Goodyear companies had
"continuous and systematic contacts" with the state to justify the
assertion of general personal jurisdiction.20 9 In his opinion, Judge
Ervin specifically noted that because "[t]he present dispute is not
related to, nor did it arise from, Defendants' contacts with North
Carolina," the case "involves general rather than specific
North Carolina's jurisdiction over the company and remains a party to the original
action. Br. for Pet'rs, supra note 197, at 4. In fact, the parent company has been
registered to do business in North Carolina since 1956, maintains a registered agent in
Raleigh, NC, and operates three manufacturing plants in the state. Id. at 5.
204 Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 385-86. Specifically, the trial court found that during that
time period 5,906 tires manufactured by Goodyear Turkey, 33,923 tires manufactured by
Goodyear France, and 6,402 tires manufactured by Goodyear Luxembourg were shipped
to North Carolina for sale through a distribution system orchestrated by the Goodyear
parent company. Id
205 Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 392.
206 Id. at 392-93.
207 Id. at 384. In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court noted that the foreign
companies "'knew or should have known that some of th[eir] tires were distributed for
sale to North Carolina residents' and that they should have 'reasonably anticipate[d]
being haled into court [in North Carolina]' on claims arising anywhere in the world."
Br. for Pet'rs, supra note 197, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
208 North Carolina's long-arm statute was intended to reach to the full extent of the
constitutional limits on jurisdiction. Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 388. "By the enactment of
[the long-arm statute] it is apparent that the General Assembly intended to make
available to the North Carolina courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible under
federal due process." Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (N.C.
1977).
209 Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 392-93.
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jurisdiction."2 10 After establishing that the facts should be
analyzed under a general rather than a specific jurisdiction
standard, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated that the key
jurisdictional question was "whether [the] Defendants have
'purposefully injected [their] product into the stream of commerce
without any indication that [they] desired to limit the area of
distribution of [their] product so as to exclude North Carolina."'
2 11
The foreign Goodyear entities argued that the stream of commerce
doctrine did not apply in instances involving general jurisdiction;
however, Judge Ervin noted that the defendants did not cite any
North Carolina cases in support of that proposition in their brief,
nor was he aware of any such cases.212
In what seems to be a deliberate effort by Judge Ervin to frame
the opinion in such a way that it would catch the attention of
higher courts, the opinion includes an analysis of the way in which
North Carolina courts have interpreted the purposeful availment
requirement and the stream of commerce doctrine following
Asahi.213  After outlining the basics of the Supreme Court's
decisions in World- Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, Judge Ervin
notes that prior North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions have
"expressly declined .. . to follow the approach to the 'purposeful
availment' issue advocated by Justice O'Connor" in Asahi.214
Instead of the stream of commerce plus test elaborated in Asahi,215
the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision purports to follow
the analysis used in World-Wide Volkswagen,2 16 which requires
mere foreseeability as a basis for personal jurisdiction.2 17 Under
the reasoning in the opinion, once a product is placed into the
stream of commerce without any indication that the manufacturer
intended to exclude North Carolina from distribution of its
210 Id. at 388.
211 Id. at 391 (quoting Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 306 S.E.2d 562, 568 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983)). If the reader understands the distinction between general and specific
jurisdiction and the basics of the stream of commerce doctrine, warning bells should be
going off at this point.
212 Id. at 394.
213 See id. at 389-91.
214 Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 389-90.
215 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
216 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
217 Id. at 298.
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product, then the manufacturer should have an expectation that its
products will be purchased by consumers in that state. Such a
manufacturer has purposefully availed itself of the benefits and
privileges of doing business in North Carolina and should
reasonably anticipate being subject to the state's jurisdiction.
Notably, the North Carolina Supreme Court declined to hear
the case, denying discretionary appeal in early 2010.218
B. The New Jersey Supreme Court Rewrites the Stream of
Commerce Doctrine to Comport with its Vision of the
Twenty-First Century Economy
The Supreme Court of New Jersey issued its decision in
Nicastro v. McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd.2 19 on February 2,
2010. Justice Barry Albin, writing for a five to two majority on
the court, held that "a foreign manufacturer that places a defective
product in the stream of commerce through a distribution scheme
that targets a national market, which includes New Jersey, may be
subject to the in personam jurisdiction of a New Jersey court in a
product-liability action." 220  The Nicastro case arose from an
industrial accident that occurred in Saddle Brook, New Jersey, on
October 11, 2001.221 Plaintiff Robert Nicastro, a thirty-year
employee of Curico Scrap Metal, was injured while operating a
McIntyre Model 640 Shear recycling machine used to cut metal.2 22
While cutting a piece of metal, Nicastro's hand accidentally
slipped forward and was caught in the machine's blade, slicing off
four of his fingers.22 3 In 2003, Nicastro initiated a product-liability
action in New Jersey Superior Court against the foreign
manufacturer and the American distributor of the machine alleging
that the shear machine was defective because it did not have a
safety guard that would have prevented the accident.224
The machine in question was manufactured by J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. ("J. McIntyre"), a British corporation. The
218 Brown v. Meter, 695 S.E.2d 756, 757 (N.C. 2010).
219 987 A.2d 575 (N.J. 2010).
220 Id. at 589.
221 Id. at 577-78.
222 Id. at 577.
223 Id. at 577.
224 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 577.
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shearing machine was sold in the United States through an
independent exclusive distributor, McIntyre Machinery America,
Ltd. ("McIntyre America"), which was headquartered in Stow,
Ohio.225 During the discovery phase of trial, the following
relevant information regarding the contacts of the manufacturer
were revealed. McIntyre America set up display booths at annual
tradeshows in various cities throughout the United States from
1990 to 2005 for the purpose of promoting J. McIntyre product
sales within the United States.226 Various J. McIntyre employees,
including the company president, attended the tradeshows where
these booths were set up during that time period to promote the
sale of its products.2 27
In the mid-1990s, the owner of Curico Scrap Metal attended a
tradeshow in Las Vegas, Nevada, and visited the booth set up by J.
McIntyre's exclusive distributor, McIntyre America. 22 Shortly
after the trade show, Curico Scrap Metal purchased from McIntyre
America the McIntyre Model 640 Shear that was involved in
Robert Nicastro's accident. 2 29 At trial, there was disagreement
over whether the written material that accompanied the machine
represented that J. McIntyre would undertake maintenance and
repair of the machine if it ever required any.230 Curico Scrap
Metal maintained that it was under the belief that any questions
regarding the machine should be directed to J. McIntyre in
England, while J. McIntyre itself maintained that it did not provide
such services in New Jersey.23 1
Following initiation of the action in the New Jersey Superior
Court, J. McIntyre entered a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.2 32 The New Jersey trial court granted the motion to
225 Id at 578. McIntyre America filed for bankruptcy in 2001. Id. at 578 n.2. The
company was granted Chapter 7 bankruptcy on July 23, 2003, before the Nicastro case
was filed. Br. for Pet'r at 3, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780
(2011) (No. 09-1343). Therefore, McIntyre America never participated in the lawsuit.
Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578 n.2.
226 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 579.
227 Id
228 Id. at 578.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 578 n.3.
231 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578 n.3.
232 Id.
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dismiss the complaint against the foreign manufacturer because
the state lacked the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the company.23 3 The trial court supported its decision by stating
that the British company had no reason to expect that its products
would be "purchased and utilized in New Jersey" and that
therefore the stream of commerce doctrine did not apply because
the company did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits and
protections of New Jersey law.234
On appeal, Judge Joseph Lisa wrote the New Jersey Appellate
Division opinion reversing the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint, noting that jurisdiction over J. McIntyre "would not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 235
The appellate division based the exercise of jurisdiction by New
Jersey courts on Justice O'Connor's stream of commerce plus
theory from Asahi.236 The appellate division went on to outline the
differences in the stream of commerce theories put forward by
Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan.2 37 In doing so, the
appellate division concluded that because the facts surrounding
Nicastro's accident met the more stringent stream of commerce
plus test, then it must also satisfy the requirements of Justice
Brennan's less restrictive test. 23 8 The Court found that J. McIntyre
had intentionally placed the machine into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that it might end up in New Jersey, and thus,
the company had also 'engaged in additional conduct indicating
an intent or purpose to serve the New Jersey market."' 2 39  The
appellate division panel highlighted several factors that supported
this statement240 and "emphasized New Jersey's 'strong interest in
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 579-80 (citations omitted).
236 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 580.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 580.
240 Id. The Appellate Division noted that,
(1) J. Mcintyre 'designated McIntyre America as its exclusive distributor for the
entire United States,' and did so 'for the purpose of selling its machines in all
fifty states,' . . .; (2) J. McIntyre knew 'that McIntyre America was not the end
user of the many machines it sold to McIntyre America,' . . .; (3) when J.
McIntyre's management officials attended trade conventions in cities in this
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providing a forum for its injured workers' . . . and the practical
benefits of litigating in [the] State" before concluding that
jurisdiction was proper.2 4'
J. McIntyre appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which
upheld jurisdiction over the British company under New Jersey's
long arm statute.24 2 From the very start, the opinion by Justice
Albin frames the main issue in the case as one that is complicated
by the global economy of the twenty-first century.243 The opinion
begins with a thought-provoking statement:
Today, all the world is a market. In our contemporary
international economy, trade knows few boundaries, and it is
now commonplace that dangerous products will find their way,
through purposeful marketing, to our nation's shores and into
our State. The question before us is whether the jurisdictional
law of this State will reflect this new reality.244
As the opening lines indicate, the New Jersey Supreme Court
felt that it could not ignore the realities of the global
marketplace. 245  The State supreme court refused to create legal
fictions that would ignore the impact of a global marketplace or
pretend that a company with a system of worldwide product
country, the company 'was engaged in purposeful conduct to avail itself of the
entire United States market,' . . .; (4) the sale to Curcio of the McIntyre Model
640 Shear 'was the result of the very distribution scheme purposefully
established by [J. McIntyre] for the sale of its machines to potential customers
located anywhere within the exclusive sales territory of McIntyre America,'
which included New Jersey . . .; and (5) J. McIntyre designed the Model 640
Shear 'to conform to United States specifications and requirements, and
represented such compliance in the instruction manual that came with the
machine.'
Id. (internal citations omitted).
24I Nicastro, 987 A. 2d at 580.
242 A New Jersey court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant to the outermost limits of federal due process. Id. at 589. "Our long-arm rule,
unlike statutes in some other states, permits service on nonresident defendants subject
only . . . to the uttermost limits permitted by the United States Constitution." Avdel
Corp. v. Mecure, 277 A.2d 207 (N.J. 1971).
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distribution was totally unaware that its products might wind up in
any state in the Union.2 46 Noting that jurisdiction must always
"comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice," the court nonetheless said that jurisdictional analysis
"must also reflect ... the radical transformation of the
international economy."247
After observing that the undisputed facts of the case showed
that J. McIntyre had no presence in, or minimum contacts with, the
state of New Jersey, Justice Albin noted that the plaintiffs case
"must sink or swim with the stream-of-commerce theory of
jurisdiction."24 8 With this admonition in mind, Justice Albin wrote
that "[a] manufacturer that knows or reasonably should know that
its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution
system that might lead to those products being sold in any of the
fifty states must expect that it will be subject to [the] jurisdiction"
of any state in which "one of its defective products is sold to a . . .
consumer, causing injury. 249 Instead of basing the analysis on
whether the manufacturer had control of the distribution scheme,
the State supreme court found it more instructive to examine
whether the manufacturer had "knowledge of the distribution
scheme through which it [received] economic benefits in each
state where its products are sold."250 Justice Albin wrote that the
only way a manufacturer can ensure that it does not become
subject to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts would be to
take reasonable steps to prevent its products from being distributed
in that state.25 1
In McIntyre, the State supreme court found that jurisdiction
was proper over J. McIntyre because it "knew or reasonably
should have known that its distribution scheme would make its
246 See id. at 590-91 ("[W]e discard outmoded constructs of jurisdiction in product-
liability cases, and embrace a modality that will provide legal relief to our citizens
harmed by the products of a foreign manufacturer that knows or should know, through
the distribution scheme it employs, that its wares might find their way into our State.").
247 Id. at 591.
248 Id. at 582.
249 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 592.
250 Id. The state Supreme Court further stated "[a] manufacturer cannot shield itself
merely by employing an independent distributor-a middleman-knowing the
predictable route the product will take to market." Id
251 Id
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products available to New Jersey consumers."25 Even though the
State supreme court found that the stream of commerce doctrine
supported jurisdiction, it maintained that if the company could
"present a compelling case that defending a product-liability
action in New Jersey would offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" then the defendant could escape being
subjected to jurisdiction in New Jersey courts. 2 53 However, it was
clear that the company could not make out such a case. The State
supreme court reasoned that it would not be "onerous or an unfair
burden" to require the company to defend itself in New Jersey
because J. McIntyre's executives regularly traveled throughout the
United States to promote the company's business interests, and
because New Jersey was better suited to handle this particular case
than those other locales.25 4 The New Jersey supreme court also
noted that it had a strong interest in keeping the case in New
Jersey because it centered on actions that took place in New Jersey
that caused injury to a New Jersey resident by a product purchased
for use in a New Jersey workplace. Further, where most of the
witnesses were located in New Jersey and the lawsuit would likely
be governed by the law of that State.255
The opinion concludes with a statement that jurisdictional
analysis does not take place in a bubble. 2 56 According to the New
Jersey supreme court:
Due process . . . must reflect the economic and social realities of
the day. The exercise of jurisdiction by New Jersey in this case
is a reasoned response to the globalization of commerce that
permits foreign manufacturers to market their products through
252 Id. at 593.
253 Id.
254 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 593. ("Certainly, defending the product-liability action in
Ohio, where J. Mcintyre's now-defunct exclusive distributor conducted business, or in
Nevada, the site of the 1994 and 1995 trade conventions, would be no more convenient
than in New Jersey. Indeed, New Jersey is a shorter distance from England than those
locales, and neither the Ohio nor Nevada courts would seem to have an interest in
resolving a product-liability action in which an English manufacturer's product injured a
New Jersey resident in New Jersey.").
255 Id. at 593-94.
256 Id. at 594.
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distribution systems that bring those products into this State.257
It is obvious from the court's constant reference throughout the
opinion to the "the economic and social realities of the day" that
the it felt compelled to deal with complicated jurisdictional issues
without reverting to legal fictions of past decades. If nothing else,
Justice Albin certainly succeeded in framing the decision in such a
way that it caught the attention of the nation's highest court.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Helen Hoens showed
deference to state and federal precedent and concluded that
jurisdiction was not supported under the facts in this case.25 8
Justice Hoens argued that the majority had failed to follow New
Jersey precedent as it related to the stream of commerce
doctrine.2 59 He noted that well-established New Jersey precedent
held that mere placement of a product into the stream of
commerce alone was not enough to trigger personal jurisdiction
over a manufacturer.260 Under Justice Hoens' analysis, neither
would the facts of the Nicastro case support jurisdiction under
either of the two tests for personal jurisdiction detailed in Asahi.26 1
The dissent went on to point out that the majority opinion would
effectively subject a foreign manufacturer to New Jersey's
jurisdiction even if the manufacturer had never targeted New
Jersey residents and had no other actual contact with the state.26 2
Finally, Justice Hoens addressed the majority's reliance on the
realities of operating in a global economy by stating that the
decision "avoids faithful application of the fundamental fairness
concerns that have long guided this Court, and the United States
Supreme Court, by relying on circular rhetoric about the global
economy." 263  Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto joined in Hoens'
dissent, but also wrote a separate dissent that chastised the
majority for reaching its decision in a manner that conflicted with
well-settled constitutional law, and suggested that the majority
257 Id.
258 See id. at 594-95 (Hoens, J., dissenting).
259 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 596-97.
260 Id. at 597.
261 Id
262 Id. at 603.
263 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 605 (Hoens, J., dissenting).
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decision was "ripe for review and correction by the Supreme Court
of the United States."264
IV. Before the Highest Court in the Land: Goodyear
and McIntyre
Crafting lower court decisions in such a way as to catch the
eye of the United States Supreme Court is no easy task. Far more
petitions by litigants are denied certiorari from the Court than are
granted an opportunity to be heard. In both Goodyear and
McIntyre, the lower court opinions were sufficiently intriguing and
the briefs submitted by the parties framed the issues involved in
the case as significant enough for the Court to take interest. On
September 28, 2010, the Court granted the petitions for certiorari
for both the Goodyear and McIntyre cases, but specified that the
cases were to be argued in tandem.2 65 On June 27, 2011, the Court
issued its decisions in both cases. While Goodyear does clarify
that the stream of commerce doctrine is not applicable to general
jurisdiction analysis, neither decision provides the degree of
clarity going forward that practitioners had hoped for when the
Court agreed to hear the cases in tandem at the beginning of the
term.266
A. Goodyear Dunlop Tires S. A. v. Brown
1. Goodyear Oral Argument
At oral argument, petitioner Goodyear's attorney began by
stressing that his clients were foreign companies that do not
conduct any business in North Carolina.2 67  He was interrupted
when he asserted that if the lower court decision were to stand,
"every significant seller of products would be subject to suit
everywhere on any claim arising anywhere." 268 The first question
came from Justice Ruth Ginsberg, possibly foreshadowing the fact
that she would later write the Court's opinion. She wished to
264 Id (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting).
265 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
266 See discussion infra Parts IV.A. - B.
267 Tr. of Oral Arg. at 3, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846 (2011) (No. 10-76) [hereinafter Goodyear Tr. of Oral Arg.].
268 Id. at 3-4.
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clarify that petitioners were not contesting jurisdiction over the
parent Goodyear corporation.2 69 Petitioners' attorney answered
that there was no objection to jurisdiction over the parent 2 70 and
later clarified the distinction between a subsidiary and an agent.27 1
Throughout the argument, several Justices returned to the issue of
liability over the parent corporation; in fact, much of the oral
argument period was related to the relationship between the parent
and its subsidiaries.27 2 It is obvious from the Justices' questions
that they felt it would be difficult to use the facts of the case to
clarify the jurisdictional split on the stream of commerce doctrine
without also dealing with the parent-subsidiary relationship
between Goodyear and its foreign subsidiaries. Justice Scalia
made this clear when he noted that unless the parent-subsidiary
question was clarified, it would be difficult to write the "opinion
that the world is waiting for."273
When asked point blank why the respondents were so anxious
to go after the foreign subsidiaries when the parent company did
not contest jurisdiction, the attorney for respondents answered that
"North Carolina has particularly Draconian requirements for
piercing the corporate veil and alter ego" such that it would be
difficult to establish proximate cause and other necessary elements
for recovery.2 74 This answer gets to the heart of the conflict the
respondents had to deal with between the realities of operating in a
global economy and navigating the complicated protections
provided by the personal jurisdiction doctrine. In general, the
petitioners' attorney agreed that under North Carolina law, it
would be difficult to establish grounds for the plaintiffs to recover
in North Carolina.2 75
When the Court asked about the appropriateness of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals basing its justification for general
269 Id. at 4.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 6-7.
272 Goodyear Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 267, at 4, 6-8, 27, 35-36, 39 (Justices
Ginsberg, Kagan, Kennedy, Scalia, and Sotomayor all asking some variation of question
about the relationship between the parent Goodyear corporation and its foreign
subsidiaries).
273 Id. at 8.
274 Id. at 37.
275 See id.
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jurisdiction on the stream of commerce analysis traditionally
reserved for specific jurisdiction fact patterns, respondents'
attorney replied that it was an incorrect interpretation of the law
that was a "detour" from established doctrine.276 Despite this
concession, respondents' attorney still felt general jurisdiction was
proper in this case because "the defendant was part of a
continuous business system or enterprise" that conducted general
business in North Carolina.277 Justice Ginsburg was not satisfied
that the activities of the foreign Goodyear entities were enough to
justify general jurisdiction in North Carolina.2 78 She seemed
particularly uncomfortable with the thought that three foreign
subsidiaries could "be sued on any and all claims" in North
Carolina.27 9 Justice Sonia Sotomayor expressed a slightly different
concern when she asked whether respondents were asking the
Court to create a "reverse principal-agent" theory that would allow
jurisdiction on the basis that the subsidiary companies had used
the parent company as an agent without actually making it an
official agent.280
There was also a brief argument by an attorney from the
United States Solicitor General's office that echoed the
jurisdictional concerns of the petitioners. The fact that the United
States chose to weigh in on the issues in this case supports the
significance of this case to foreign corporations. While the United
States' argument simply echoed many of the arguments for lack of
personal jurisdiction that were put forward by the petitioners, the
brief submitted by the United States clearly stressed that finding
jurisdiction over the foreign Goodyear manufacturers could
"potentially threaten the United States foreign trade and
diplomatic interests."28 ' After paying lip service to North
Carolina's interest in providing a forum for its citizens, the United
States claimed that the "exercise of jurisdiction here exceeds what
276 Id. at 24.
277 Goodyear Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 267, at 27.
278 Id. at 33-34.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 35.
281 Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Pet'rs at 2, Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76).
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many nations would recognize as reasonable." 2 82  At oral
argument, an Assistant Solicitor General pointed out that the
United States was interested in the outcome of the Goodyear case
because of its great "magnitude."28 3
While the magnitude of the case might have been great, it was
clear by the end of oral argument that the Justices were of a mind
jurisdiction over the foreign tire manufacturers was not proper;
and regardless of whom the Court chose to write Goodyear, it was
clear that there would be a high degree of concurrence among the
members. 284 There was also an overarching sense that the Court
was ready to move on with the Goodyear case so that it could get
285to more complicated issues.
2. Goodyear: There's No Place Like Home
Writing for a Court that unanimously agreed to reverse the
decision from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 28 6 Justice
Ginsberg began with a clear declaration that the opinion would be
about general jurisdiction and nothing else.287 Any hope that the
Court might use Goodyear2" to clarify a broader spectrum of
issues in the personal jurisdiction realm was dashed by the
opening lines of the opinion. Nonetheless, a clear line between
specific and general jurisdiction was needed, and it is good the
Court spent time on the point.289 The lower court decision made it
evident that the two types of personal jurisdiction can be confused
282 Id. at 30.
283 Goodyear Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 267, at 20-21.
284 See id.
285 See id.
286 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2858 (2011).
287 Id. at 2850 ("We address, in particular, this question: Are foreign subsidiaries of
a United States parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to
any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum State?"). The Goodyear decision dismissed
without discussion of the merits the contention by respondents' attorney that the Court
should "pierce Goodyear corporate veils" in order to view the foreign Goodyear
companies and Goodyear USA as a single entity for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 2857.
Justice Ginsberg noted that the respondents had not brought up this argument before the
lower court or in their brief in response to the petition for certiorari, thereby forfeiting
that argument in front of the highest court in the land. Id.
288 Id.
289 See Rhodes, supra note 3, at 818-19.
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and the tests for each incorrectly applied.2 90 The Goodyear2 9'
opinion sends the overarching message that the use of the stream
of commerce doctrine to assert general jurisdiction over
defendants directly opposes the intent of the Court. The decision,
which clearly denounces the North Carolina Court of Appeals'
position, provides international companies with "fair warning that
a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign."2 92
Following a brief description of the case, the Court
summarized the differences between general and specific
jurisdiction.2 93 General jurisdiction is appropriate in forums where
the defendant is "essentially at home."2 94 Specific jurisdiction
"depends on an affiliation between the forum and the underlying
controversy, principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place
in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State's
regulation."29 5 The two types of jurisdiction are vastly different in
that once general jurisdiction is established, the defendant can be
prosecuted in the forum on any cause of action, whereas specific
jurisdiction is limited to issues or controversies that give rise to a
particular cause of action.29 6
The first hint, besides the Court's unanimity, that the decision
would not favor the respondents is a line suggesting that the North
Carolina Court of Appeals had "confus[ed] or blend[ed] general
and specific jurisdictional inquiries."29 7 Clearly it would be
difficult to find general jurisdiction over the petitioners under the
facts of the case at hand:
290 See Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 391-92 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009); see also
Rhodes, supra note 3, at 837-38 ("It is not uncommon for a general jurisdiction opinion
to draw parallels on the substantiality of contacts from specific jurisdiction cases, despite
the oft-recognized maxim that a more stringent test must be employed for general
jurisdiction. Without a coherent decisional foundation, precedential comparisons will
only deepen the mire in the swamp.").
291 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
292 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
293 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
294 Id. at 2851 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
This language regarding a defendant's "home" is new and intriguing, but ultimately will
cause increased confusion as discussed below.
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[P]etitioners are not registered to do business in North Carolina.
They have no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in
North Carolina. They do not design, manufacture, or advertise
their products in North Carolina. And they do not solicit
business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship tires to
North Carolina customers. . . . Petitioners state, and respondents
do not here deny, that the type of tire involved in the accident, a
Goodyear Regional RHS tire manufactured by Goodyear
Turkey, was never distributed in North Carolina. 298
Even assuming, as the North Carolina Court of Appeals did,
that some of the tires made by the foreign Goodyear entities had
entered North Carolina through a distribution scheme, the Court
held that "[a] connection so limited between the forum and the
foreign corporation . . . is an inadequate basis for the exercise of
general jurisdiction."2 9 9 The Court cautioned that traditional
concepts of specific jurisdiction, such as the stream of commerce
analysis, should not be imported into the general jurisdictional
inquiry.300 Therefore, the Court provided a clear message that the
stream of commerce analysis does not apply in general jurisdiction
cases and unanimously held that the foreign Goodyear defendants
were not properly subject to the jurisdiction of North Carolina
courts under a stream of commerce theory with respect to the bus
accident in France.
It would have been better had the Court stopped with that basic
holding, but the Court may have unintentionally muddled the
general jurisdiction waters further by introducing some
metaphorical language to explain under what circumstances
general jurisdiction might be appropriate. As Justice Ginsburg
summarized: "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation
is fairly regarded as at home."30 1
298 Id. at 2852.
299 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
300 Id. at 2855 ("The North Carolina court's stream-of-commerce analysis elided
the essential difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.").
301 Id. at 2853-54 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 728 (1988)). Brilmayer's article identifies domicile,
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The question then becomes, where is a corporation's
metaphorical home for purposes of general jurisdiction? The
Court clearly did not find that the Goodyear foreign entities were
at home in North Carolina under the facts of the case,302 but
unfortunately, the Court never expanded upon what the "home
test" means in a way that would provide much guidance to future
litigants dealing with facts different than those at issue in
Goodyear.3 03 Instead, the Court pointed back to a seminal case as
the textbook example of an appropriate assertion of general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation: "Unlike the defendant in
Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in
Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina."3 04
While the idea of home connotes a single place in day-to-day
conversation, and while the mining company in Perkins conducted
its activities from a "sole" location, the Court in Goodyear clearly
did not mean to imply that a business is at home in only one
location. The Court cited Brilmayer's article, which posits that
general jurisdiction would be appropriate over a corporation in at
least two places: the place of incorporation and the principal place
of business.305 While the Court made clear that general
jurisdiction is not limited to only one place,30 6 there will likely be
confusion going forward regarding whether general jurisdiction
under the "home test" would be appropriate in more than the two
places listed by Professor Brilmayer.307 This is because in the
sentence directly following the one in which the Court found that
the Goodyear petitioners were not "at home in North Carolina,"
the Court noted that the Goodyear petitioners did not have the
place of incorporation, and principal place of business as the paradigmatic bases for the
assertion of general jurisdiction. Brilmayer, supra, at 728.
302 Id. at 2856. The Court compared the lack of ties of the Goodyear foreign
companies with North Carolina to the insufficient ties to Texas discussed in
Helicopteros. Id ("We see no reason to differentiate from the ties to Texas held
insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of petitioners' tires sporadically made in North
Carolina through intermediaries. . . . North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be
permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.").
303 See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856.
304 Id. at 2856-57.
305 Id. at 2853-54.
306 Id.
307 See id.; Brilmayer, supra note 301, at 728.
592 [Vol. XXXVII
STAYING AFLOAT IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE
"continuous and systematic general business contacts" necessary
for general jurisdiction. 308 By connecting the new "home test"
with the traditional test for continuous and systematic general
business contacts, the Court seemed to imply that, depending on a
corporation's business structure and operations, there may be an
infinite number of places where a business could be found at home
for purposes of general jurisdiction.
At the same time, the Court limited where a defendant could
be found at home by rejecting the lower court's "sprawling view"
of general jurisdiction under which "any substantial manufacturer
or seller of goods would be amenable to suit, on any claim for
relief, wherever its products are distributed."3 09 That statement
implies that a defendant's home for purposes of general
jurisdiction means something more than intentionally distributing
a product in the forum. At the very least, it would seem that a
company must have formally registered to do business in a state,
established a physical presence in the state, appointed agents in the
state, and so on before general jurisdiction might attach.
However, it is possible that even those types of forum activities
would not be enough for the home test of general jurisdiction.
Certainly those examples are not as continuous and systematic as
the paradigms of place of incorporation and principal place of
business, nor are they as substantial as having a home office in the
state, as in Perkins.3 10 Therefore, the home test for general
jurisdiction would be satisfied by a fact pattern that falls
somewhere between the vast spectrum of Goodyear, where there
were virtually no attenuated contacts with the forum, at the lower
end, and Perkins, where the corporation had its sole headquarters
in the forum, at the upper end.
To illustrate the problem, think about McDonald's, which is
incorporated in Delaware and has its corporate headquarters in
Illinois.' McDonald's has a significant physical presence in
308 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (internal quotations omitted).
309 Id. at 2856-57.
310 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
311 See Restated Certificate of Incorporation of McDonald's Corporation (June 1,
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every state in the nation, indeed throughout most of the
industrialized world. If a North Carolinian were injured in
California by a scalding hot cup of McDonald's coffee, then he
could presumably sue McDonald's under a theory of general
jurisdiction at its Delaware "home" or at its Illinois "home" (he
could also sue in California under a theory of specific jurisdiction
since the cause of action would have arisen out of activities that
took place there). But what if he wanted to sue in North Carolina
because of the inconvenience of having to travel to one of those
other states to prosecute his claim against the company? To
proceed in North Carolina the fictional plaintiff would have to
bring suit under a theory of general jurisdiction claiming that
McDonald's also had a home in North Carolina. Given that
McDonald's likely does millions of dollars in sales each year
through its physical stores across North Carolina, this does not
seem to be a far-fetched theory. McDonald's contacts with the
forum of North Carolina are certainly more continuous,
systematic, and substantial than those of the foreign Goodyear
entities, although maybe not as continuous, systematic, and
substantial as the contacts of the mining company in Perkins3 12
with Ohio. Do McDonald's contacts make them at home in North
Carolina or are they simply on an extended vacation stay there?
That the Court did not further narrow the home test parameters
for general jurisdiction is unsurprising given that the decision
below was so clearly incorrect. The Court appropriately dealt with
the issues in front of it and moved on; in doing so, the Court made
it clear that stream of commerce analysis does not apply in general
jurisdiction cases.313 Nonethless, in light of the decision's
precedential effect, it is frustrating that the Court did not provide a
blueprint outlining how to construct, or avoid unintentionally
constructing, a jurisdictional home for corporations. Lower courts
and the attorneys who practice in front of them must now frame up
jurisdictional homes with the understanding that they are building
on shaky ground that might collapse beneath their feet. On the
bright side, corporations can take some comfort in knowing that
state courts cannot use the stream of commerce, which has risen
steadily over the past decades, to threaten jurisdictional home
312 342 U.S. at 447-48.
313 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857.
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construction based on a theory of general jurisdiction.
B. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
1. McIntyre Oral Argument
Throughout the oral argument by both parties, members of the
Court posed a number of questions and hypothetical situations
evincing its desire to really figure out which facts should turn the
case and what limitations should be placed on the stream of
commerce doctrine. More so than in Goodyear, the McIntyre oral
argument highlighted the Court's difficulty in grappling with the
complicated jurisdictional issues at play in the case. The main
issue seemed to be whether there should be a national standard
allowing jurisdiction in any state in the United States over foreign
manufacturers that target the entire United States without
specifying or avoiding particular states for their sales.34
At argument, the attorney for petitioners barely got out an
entire sentence before Justice Scalia asked the first question.3 15
Justice Scalia set the tone for much of the rest of the argument
when he asked about the relationship between J. McIntyre, the
British manufacturer, and McIntyre America, the domestic
distributor.3 16 Throughout the argument several Justices seemed
very interested in the amount of control that J. McIntyre exhibited
over its American distributor. Petitioners' attorney conceded that
J. McIntyre wanted its distributor in the United States to sell as
many J. McIntyre products as possible, but held fast to the line that
J. McIntyre had made no attempt to target any specific state,
including New Jersey."' It was the distributor's choice as "market
manager" where to actually sell products in the United States.318
The petitioner's attorney felt that the Court's jurisprudence made
it clear that jurisdiction may only attach by a "direct act" of a
foreign manufacturer that "look[s] toward a specific State." 3 19
314 See Tr. of Oral Arg. At 3, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780
(2011) (No. 09-1343) [hereinafter McIntyre Tr. of Oral Arg.].
315 Id.
316 See id. at 3-4.
317 Id. at 4-5.
318 Id. at 5.
319 McIntyre Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 314, at 6.
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When asked by Justice Ginsburg where in the United States
jurisdiction would be appropriate against J. McIntyre, petitioners'
attorney answered that Ohio would be an appropriate venue
because that is where its American distributor was located and
where J. McIntyre had direct contact with the United States.3 20
However, the attorney became so tripped up trying to explain why
jurisdiction in Ohio would be appropriate in an action that
involves specific and not general jurisdiction that Justice Scalia
interrupted him by stating, "I don't think it's worth your time,
because frankly it doesn't make a whole lot of difference to me
whether they can sue in Ohio or not."321
The respondents' attorney began by reminding the Court that
the manufacturer purposefully availed itself of the entire United
States market and knew or should have known that it could be
haled into court in any jurisdiction where its products were sold.322
Upon being questioned about this theory, respondents' attorney
elaborated that putting a product into the stream of commerce by
itself was not enough to confer jurisdiction in every state in which
a plaintiff is injured by a foreign manufacturer's product without
"some additional conduct, some concrete steps taken."3 23 In this
case, respondents' attorney noted that the additional conduct by J.
McIntyre consisted of attending trade shows and hiring an
exclusive distributor to sell in the United States.3 24 According to
the respondents, these actions or others like them, such as
designing the product for the forum, coupled with injury in the
forum, should combine to allow jurisdiction over foreign
manufacturers.
There were several policy concerns mentioned by the Court
throughout the respondents' argument. Justice Breyer expressed a
significant concern with creating a rule that "subjects every small
business ... in every developing country to have to be aware of
the law in 50 States simply because they agreed to sell to an
independent company who is going to sell to America."3 2 5 Justice
320 Id. at 8-10.
321 Id. at 13.
322 See id. at 26-27.
323 See id. at 28-32.
324 McIntyre Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 314, at 32.
325 Id. at 30.
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Breyer noted that such a policy would impede world
development.32 6 Both Justices Ginsburg and Scalia indicated their
concern that finding that jurisdiction was proper over J. McIntyre
might open the door for other nations to insist that the United
States begin recognizing the assertion of jurisdiction over
American companies based on skeptical jurisdictional models in
those foreign nations: Justice Scalia described the potential
landscape in the aftermath of such a decision as "a little scary." 32 7
Another interesting theme of the argument that received little
discussion in the parties' briefs was the potential effect that
modern Internet communication has on the question of
jurisdiction. 328 The Justices were curious whether some level of
Internet activity between a product manufacturer and buyer would
create purposeful availment of the benefits and privileges of a
forum state. Respondents' attorney noted that he had deliberately
not briefed the Internet complications, but attempted to answer the
Justices' questions based on his theory of purposeful availment.3 29
Respondents' attorney characterized the key to finding jurisdiction
based on Internet sites as whether the site is interactive.3 30 If the
customer can "press buttons on his computer and complete the
transaction with the result that the product comes to New Jersey,"
then jurisdiction is proper.3 3! In contrast, if the website is more
like a "billboard," then it is just "pure advertising" and insufficient
to support jurisdiction.33 2
At the end of argument it was clear that there were persuasive
arguments on both sides and that the Court could potentially go
either way. The Court appeared to be divided as to whether or not
targeting the entire United States could support specific
jurisdiction in individual states. There certainly appeared to be at
least two general factions among the Court.3 33 The faction made
up of Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor seemed more
326 See id. at 31.
327 Id. at 36.
328 See id. at 37, 55.
329 McIntyre Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 314, at 55.
330 Id.
331 Id. at 57-58.
332 Id. at 56.
333 See id.
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inclined to allow jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.3 34 The faction
made up of Justices Alito and Scalia, and Chief Justice Roberts
seemed less inclined to permit jurisdiction.3 35 The difference in
these two main factions centered on whether actual knowledge by
the British manufacturer that its machinery would be sold in New
Jersey was necessary to the stream of commerce theory. As usual,
Justice Thomas did not ask any questions so it was impossible to
judge his impression from the oral argument transcripts. Both
Justices Breyer and Kennedy seemed to straddle the fence with
their questions and comments; Justices Breyer and Kennedy were
also the two Justices who expressed the most concern about the
policy implications of allowing the New Jersey courts to extend
jurisdiction over J. McIntyre.33 6 More so than any of the other
Justices, Justice Breyer seemed to be very uncertain of his feelings
about the case. At one point during the discussion, Justice Breyer
acknowledged that the case was complicated when he stated, "I
mean, I'm nervous. I see a lot of rather deep issues here, and ...
that's what [is] making me nervous."33 7
2. McIntyre: Another Divided Decision
When the Court released a divided plurality opinion on June
27, it was immediately obvious that McIntyre... was unlikely to
clean up the jurisdictional landscape in the way that practitioners
had hoped when the Court accepted certiorari. While the Court
did reverse the decision of the court below, it did so with a 4-2-3
split.339 Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and
Justices Scalia and Thomas, announced the reversal of the lower
court decision and delivered the plurality opinion. Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Alito, issued a concurring opinion. Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, wrote a
dissent. While disappointing, the breakdown is not that surprising
given the tenor of questioning at oral argument.
334 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.c.
335 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b.
336 See discussion infra Parts IV.B.2.a. - b.
337 McIntyre Tr. of Oral Arg., supra note 314, at 35.
338 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
339 See id. at 2785.
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a. The Kennedy Plurality
The Kennedy plurality almost immediately acknowledged that
the Court's past decision in Asahi3 40 had muddled the jurisdictional
waters through use of the stream of commerce metaphor. In an
attempt to acknowledge the confusion that past decisions had
created, Justice Kennedy noted that while the New Jersey Supreme
Court was incorrect in its holding and application of the stream of
commerce doctrine, "[t]his Court's Asahi decision [might have
been] responsible in part for that court's error regarding the stream
of commerce, and this case presents an opportunity to provide
greater clarity."34'
Justice Kennedy then went into a discussion of the due process
concerns at play in cases like the one before the Court.342 In all
situations, due process mandates that maintenance of a suit not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."34 3
This requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the
forum such that the defendant can be said to have "purposefully
avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." 34 4 "[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State
have a due process right not to be subjected to judgment in its
courts as a general matter."3 45  However, under the theory of
specific jurisdiction a corporation "submits to the judicial power
of an otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is
exercised in connection with the [corporation's] activities touching
on the State.""'
Justice Kennedy then expounded at length upon the confusion
created by Asahi:
The imprecision arising from Asahi, for the most part, results
340 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
341 Id. at 2785-86 ("The rules and standards for determining when a State does or
does not have jurisdiction over an absent party have been unclear because of decades-old
questions left open in Asahi.") (internal citations omitted).
342 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786-87.
343 Id. at 2787 (citations omitted).
344 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
345 Id.
346 Id at 2788.
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from its statement of the relation between jurisdiction and the
"stream of commerce." The stream of commerce, like other
metaphors, has its deficiencies as well as its utility. It refers to
the movement of goods from manufacturers through distributors
to consumers, yet beyond that descriptive purpose its meaning is
far from exact. This Court has stated that a defendant's placing
goods into the stream of commerce "with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers within the forum State"
may indicate purposeful availment. But that statement does not
amend the general rule of personal jurisdiction. It merely
observes that a defendant may in an appropriate case be subject
to jurisdiction without entering the forum ... The principal
inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant's activities
manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. In
other words, the defendant must "purposefully avai[l] itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
Sometimes a defendant does so by sending its goods rather than
its agents. The defendant's transmission of goods permits the
exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to
have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that
the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the
forum State.347
Subsequently, the plurality rejected the Brennan concurrence
approach to the stream of commerce doctrine in Asahi, which
suggests that jurisdictional decisions may be based on notions of
"fairness and foreseeability."3 48 Justice Kennedy found fault with
Brennan's contention that
jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into the
stream of commerce [without more] is consistent with the Due
Process Clause, [for] [a]s long as a participant in this process is
aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum
State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a
surprise. 3 49
347 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (internal citations omitted).
348 Id.
349 Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
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Rejecting Brennan's theory, the plurality found that the
authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a
"forum-by-forum" decision based not on a defendant's
expectations, but upon his actions.5 o "The question is whether a
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society
or economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign,
so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to
judgment concerning that conduct."3 5 ' Mere foreseeability was
rejected as a criterion for judging whether personal jurisdiction
might be appropriate.3 52
This is consistent with Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi
that purposeful availment, and purposeful availment alone, of the
benefits and privileges of the sovereign is the key to deciding
whether a defendant should be subjected to the authority of a
court.5  As Justice Kennedy wrote, "Freeform notions of
fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot
transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority into
law."354 The primary question in jurisdictional cases is not one of
fairness; it is a question of whether a defendant, by his or her
activities, has manifested an intention to submit to a sovereign's
power.355
Applying Justice O'Connor's purposeful availment theory of
jurisdiction to the facts at hand, the plurality concluded that J.
McIntyre had not purposefully directed any conduct at the forum
of New Jersey.336 The facts evinced no contacts between the
British manufacturer and the forum of New Jersey other than the
single machine that had ended up in the factory where respondent
was injured."' Rather, all that the facts showed was a desire by J.
McIntyre to direct its "marketing and sales efforts at the [entire]
United States," and it "is petitioner's purposeful contacts with
350 Id. at 2789.
351 Id.
352 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
353 Id. at 2790; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
354 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787.
355 See id.
356 Id. at 2790-91.
357 See id. at 2790.
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New Jersey, not with the United States, that alone are relevant.""'
The Court held that because J. McIntyre did not engage in any
specific activities in or toward New Jersey that revealed "an intent
to invoke or benefit from the protection of its laws [, the forum] is
without power to adjudge the rights and liabilities" of the British
manufacturer.3 5 9 Therefore, New Jersey's exercise of jurisdiction
in this context violated the principles of due process.3"o
While Justice Kennedy started the plurality opinion with a
clear acknowledgement and seeming desire to rectify the
confusion caused by the dueling theories of the stream of
commerce in Asahi,36 1 he conceded in his writing that there will be
further work to do on this subject following the McIntyre
opinion.36 The holding "that the authority to subject a defendant
to judgment depends on purposeful availment ... does not by
itself resolve many difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise
in particular cases." 63 Personal jurisdiction questions must be
analyzed in light of the conduct and economic realities present in
individual cases." Each case must be decided on its own merits,
and by this process "judicial exposition will, in common-law
fashion, clarify the contours" of purposeful availment. 6' This is
an encouraging line, but without an actual majority opinion from
the Court, judicial exposition at the lower court level is just as
likely to muddy the waters as it is to set things straight.
b. The Breyer Concurrence
By contrast, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, would not
accept McIntyre as a vehicle to begin clearing up some of the
confusion left in the wake of Asahi,3 66 though he did agree with the
plurality that the lower court should be reversed.3 67 Noting rapid
358 Id
359 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791.
360 Id
361 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
362 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791.
363 Id. at 2790.
364 See id.
365 Id.
366 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
367 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 ("1 agree with the plurality that the contrary
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changes to modem commerce and communication, Justice Breyer
wrote that it would be "unwise to announce a rule of broad
applicability without full consideration of the modem-day
consequences." 368 In his view, the case could be reversed solely
on Court precedent because it seemingly did not present any novel
concepts requiring a new rule.369 Precedent dictated that "a single
isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort
indicated here, is [not] sufficient" to support jurisdiction.370
Without some greater evidence of a desire to serve the New Jersey
market, there could be no jurisdiction over J. McIntyre under
either version of the stream of commerce theory.371' Therefore,
there was no reason to create "strict rules that limit jurisdiction" as
the plurality did.372
Justice Breyer did indicate that he expected (hopefully in the
near future) a case to come before the Court that will serve as a
suitable vehicle to refashion the current jurisdictional
conundrum.37 3 That case would contain more complicated
jurisdictional issues such as Internet sales, marketing through the
use of popup advertisements, or distribution through an
intermediary like Amazon.com. 3 74 Justice Breyer conceded that
arguments, including one by the Solicitor General of the United
States, in that type of case might very well bring about a change in
the law as it currently stands.375




370 Id at 2792 ("[A] single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an
adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that
defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that
such a sale will take place.")
371 See id.
372 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793.
373 See id. at 2792-93.
374 Id. at 2793.
375 Id. at 2794 ("1 would not work such a change to the law in the way either the
plurality or the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests without a better understanding of
the relevant contemporary commercial circumstances. Insofar as such considerations are
relevant to any change in present law, they might be presented in a case (unlike the
present one) in which the Solicitor General participates").
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c. The Ginsburg Dissent
The dissenting Justices, led by Justice Ginsburg, would have
held that jurisdiction over the British manufacturing company was
appropriate based on what she called principles of fundamental
fairness.37 6 In rebuke of the six Justices who held that jurisdiction
was not proper over J. McIntyre, Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered
majority today turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern
long arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into
court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its
hands of a product by having independent distributors market
377
This view is overly dramatic given that the fractured majority
opinion falls far short of a comprehensive solution to the questions
facing lower courts and practitioners. In any case, not even the
Kennedy plurality implied that using an independent distributor
would absolve a defendant of all liability in all cases.37 8
Not surprisingly, the "story" behind the case is prominently
featured in Justice Ginsburg's dissent. The dissent conducted a
thorough review of J. McIntyre and its American distributor, and
also provided an overview of the scrap metal recycling industry in
the United States. The focus on J. McIntyre's business and
marketing efforts was tailored to show what Justice Ginsburg saw
as the company's desire to market and sell its metal recycling
equipment throughout the United States, 3 79 and by extension in
every individual state.380 In the dissenting Justices' view, the
American distributor should not have shielded the British
376 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2795.
377 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
378 See id at 2788-89.
379 See id. at 2795-97 (noting evidence such as references to America in the
company's product brochures, instruction manuals, and other material as well as a letter
by J. McIntyre's president that implied the company's goal was to sell its products in
America).
380 See id. at 2801 ("[B]y engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its
machines in the United States, 'purposefully availed itself of the United States market
nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete collection of States . . . [but] the
market of all States.").
604 [Vol. XXXVII
STAYING AFLOAT IN THE STREAM OF COMMERCE
manufacturer from liability in individual states."' The dissent also
provided some interesting information about New Jersey, namely
that in 2008, more recycled scrap metal was processed in New
Jersey than in any other American state. 382 Surely, Justice
Ginsburg posited, J. McIntyre intended that its scrap metal
recycling machinery be used in the state that recycled the most
scrap metal.38 3 The weight of the evidence led Justice Ginsburg to
conclude that "[t]he machine [that injured respondent] arrived
in . .. New Jersey . .. not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result
of the U.S. connections and distribution system that [J.] McIntyre
UK deliberately arranged." 3 84
One of the main contentions the dissent had with the plurality
opinion is the belief that "the constitutional limits on a state
court's adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due
process [i.e., fairness and foreseeability], not state sovereignty."
In the dissent's view, the entire idea behind the Court's modem
approach to jurisdiction over corporations is based on principles of
reason and fairness.8 Justice Ginsburg wrote that the facts in
McIntyre were representative of the types of marketing and
distribution schemes common in the modem global economy.8
Therefore, the dissent held that it was "fair and reasonable, given
the mode of trading of which this case is an example, to require
the international seller to defend at the place its products cause
injury. "388
In the final lines of the dissent, Justice Ginsburg took a parting
shot at the six Justices who made up the fractured majority.8 She
381 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (citing a letter from J. McIntyre to McIntyre
America purporting to assure the distributor that the British manufacturer would take
responsibility for any problems with the manufacturer's machines).
382 Id. at 2795 ("New Jersey recycling facilities processed 2,013,730 tons of scrap
iron, steel, aluminum, and other metals-more than any other State").
383 Id. at 2801 ("How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its actions targeting
a national market, to sell products in the fourth largest destination for imports among all
States of the United States and the largest scrap metal market?").
384 Id. at 2797.
385 Id. at 2798.
386 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800.
387 Id. at 2799-800.
388 See id. at 2800.
389 See id. at 2804.
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reminded them that the lower court might have been reversed, but
ultimately the decision changed little regarding personal
jurisdiction analysis. She wrote, "[w]hile I dissent from the
Court's judgment, I take heart that the plurality opinion does not
speak for the Court, for that opinion would take a giant step away
from the 'notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 390
V. Conclusions
In the Goodyear3 9 ' and McIntyre3 92 cases, the Court had one of
its best opportunities to clear the murky waters of the stream of
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. To say it missed that
opportunity entirely would not give the Court its due credit, but
surely practitioners and lower courts have a right to be
disappointed that the confounding plurality opinions in Asahi393
have been replaced by yet another set of plurality opinions on the
same basic subject. While the nuances of the Court's decision and
what the Court could or should have done will surely engender
significant academic and legal scholarship until the next time the
Court chooses to address personal jurisdiction, corporate players
in the global economy are left to pick up the pieces left behind in
Goodyear and McIntyre in order to structure their business
operations for the here and now. With that in mind, I turn now to
what corporations with multi-state and international operations
should take away from these decisions.
In Goodyear, the Court explained the basic difference between
general and specific jurisdiction and emphatically held that the
stream of commerce analysis does not apply to general
jurisdiction.39 4 While helpful as a point of practice, it was an all
but inevitable outcome as several federal circuits and state high
courts in the past have uniformly adopted the bright-line rule that a
defendant's mere placement of a product into the stream of
commerce cannot support an assertion of general jurisdiction over
that defendant.39 5  A corporate defendant's systematic and
390 Id.
391 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
392 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
393 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
394 131 S. Ct. at 2857.
395 See, e.g., D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566
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continuous contacts with a forum must be substantial in order for a
forum to invoke general jurisdiction. While the "home test"
outlined by Justice Ginsburg might provide lower courts with a
chance to expand (incorrectly in my view) general jurisdiction
under certain facts, in most instances, foreign corporations can rest
easy given that the systematic and continuous contacts necessary
to assert general jurisdiction will be found only in a place of
incorporation or a principal place of business.3 96
McIntyre,3 97 which is clearly a more difficult case, presented
the Court with the chance to clarify the stream of commerce
doctrine as it applies in specific jurisdiction situations. From the
start, the impact of this case was likely to be more consequential,
as questions of specific jurisdiction over non-forum defendants
arise much more frequently in the lower courts. A fractured
majority of the Court signaled that a foreign corporation may take
certain steps to circumvent a forum's specific jurisdiction, even
though damage to the plaintiff occurred within the state.3 98 The
chief action that foreign manufacturers should take to limit a
forum's jurisdiction is to conduct sales in the United States
through an independent nationwide distributor. In McIntyre, the
British manufacturer conducted its sales through an independent
American distributor, so it stands to reason that other foreign
corporations would benefit equally from the use of an independent
distributor. Use of an independent distributor does not necessarily
mean that a manufacturer must relinquish all control over where
its products end up. McIntyre supports the idea that a
manufacturer may target the United States market generally and
may even have a hand in the general marketing effort, provided
F.3d 94, 106 (3d Cir. 2009) (declining to "unjustifiably ... treat the stream-of-commerce
theory as a source of general jurisdiction"); Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-
Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that "the stream of
commerce theory . . . provides no basis for exercising general jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant"); Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 216 (5th
Cir. 2000) ("We have specifically rejected a party's reliance on the stream-of-commerce
theory to support asserting general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant."); Spir Star
AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. 2010) (holding that the stream of commerce
analysis is not relevant to general personal jurisdiction).
396 See supra text accompanying note 416.
397 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
398 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a.
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that the manufacturer's actions are not directed at any one state.3 99
Business-minded individuals might also take some solace from
the decisions in Goodyear and McIntyre. It was apparent from the
oral arguments and briefs in both cases that upholding the lower
court decisions might have had a negative impact on American
business relationships with foreign nations. If either decision had
been allowed to stand, then foreign manufacturers whose products
are indirectly distributed in America by third parties without the
manufacturers' knowledge would have been deprived of the right
to structure operations in such a way as to give some control over
where they might expect to be sued. This would have encouraged
forum shopping for the best place to sue a foreign defendant.
Further, under the lower court in McIntyre, a foreign defendant
might have to be aware of the law in every state where its product
might potentially end-up should an individual be injured by the
product there. That a majority of the Court rejected this scenario
is a positive outcome to most business-minded thinkers.
The impact of the decisions in these cases will soon become
apparent as lower courts grapple with how to properly apply them
to disparate fact patterns. As is the way with a common law
system, the boundaries of the Court's decision will be tested, and
almost inevitably the jurisdictional lines will be redrawn. The
beauty of our legal system is that if the lower courts get things
"wrong," then in good time the Court can try to set things "right"
again. In light of our complex global economy and our ever-
growing interconnectedness, Justice Breyer's hypothetical
jurisdiction case involving a foreign defendant who markets
through the Internet or distributes through dotcom intermediaries
is sure to arise sometime in the near future.400 More than likely,
we will not have to wait another quarter century for the ship of
personal jurisdiction to sail down the stream of commerce.40 '
399 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.a.
400 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.b.
401 See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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